Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard In Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing by Ellias, Jared A.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2016
Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral
Hazard In Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior
Activist Investing
Jared A. Ellias
UC Hastings College of the Law, elliasjared@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard In Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, 8 J. Leg.
Anal. 493 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1429
DO ACTIVIST INVESTORS CONSTRAIN
MANAGERIAL MORAL HAZARD IN CHAPTER 11?:
EVIDENCE FROM JUNIOR ACTIVIST INVESTING
Jared A. Ellias*
A B S T R A C T
This article examines the hedge fund investment strategy of buying junior claims of
Chapter 11 debtors and playing an activist role in the bankruptcy process. These
hedge funds are often accused of rent-seeking by managers. I use a new methodology
to conduct the first empirical study of this investment strategy. I find little evidence that
junior activists abuse the bankruptcy process to extract hold-up value. Instead, the re-
sults suggest that they constrain managerial self-dealing and promote the bankruptcy
policy goals of maximizing creditor recoveries and distributing the firm’s value in ac-
cordance with the absolute priority rule.
(JEL codes: G23, G30, G33).
Hedge funds that specialize in distressed investing have grown to manage more
than $140 billion in assets, up from $4 billion in 2000.1 Some of these hedge
funds are activist investors that try to influence the restructuring of distressed
firms. One of the most common activist investing strategies is to buy junior
claims—such as unsecured debt or equity—and participate in the Chapter 11
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process.2 The hedge funds that execute junior activist investing strategies are
thought to be substantially more litigious and aggressive than the more staid
financial institutions that held junior claims in earlier years of the bankruptcy
code (Miller 2007). One judge recently described a junior activist as using
“aggressive bankruptcy litigation tactics as a means to gain negotiating leverage
or obtain judicial rulings that will enable it to . . . reap profits in connection with
acquired, deeply discounted bankruptcy claims. Such activist strategies are an
increasingly familiar part of the landscape in large chapter 11 cases.”3
Many observers and market participants believe that the junior activists
negatively impact the governance of bankrupt firms. Junior activists are gener-
ally perceived to be rent seekers that use “terrorist [litigation] tactics” to extract
hold-up value settlements from senior creditors (Ross 2013). They are blamed
for increasing bankruptcy costs as management spends more on expensive
lawyers and the firm lingers in bankruptcy longer than would otherwise have
been the case. This view is so widely held that Moody’s recovery models for
senior debt mention anticipated settlement payments to junior activists
(Gupton & Stein 2002). The problem of junior activism has provoked a power-
ful response from the debt markets. Between 2003 and 2012, investment banks
underwrote more than $100 billion in junior corporate debt with innovative
contractual provisions that limit the ability of junior activists to file objections
in bankruptcy court (Seife 2004; Miller 2012).
Junior activists, however, see themselves as standing up for the rights of
investors against opportunistic managers (Gilson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback
2000). The bankruptcy code places a firm’s managers in control of the
Chapter 11 process, subject to a fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the
firm’s assets for distribution to creditors.4 Thus, as fiduciaries, managers must
make a series of critical business decisions: Should the firm be sold as a going
concern, liquidated in pieces or reorganized independently? What will the
reorganized firm’s business plan look like and how much money do managers
expect the firm to generate in the future? Most importantly, management must
accurately appraise the firm’s assets to determine how much value is available
2 Bankruptcy scholarship usually considers “senior creditors” to be secured lenders and “junior cred-
itors” to be unsecured creditors or shareholders. The reality of modern finance is more complex. In
this article, I use the term “junior claims” to include any claim that arises from debt or equity that is
ranked lower than a senior class of debt or equity. In practice, the nature of the claims held by senior
or junior claimholders varies with the facts of the case and the complexity of the capital structure.
“Junior activists” are investors in junior claims.
3 In re Ion Media Networks, 419 B.R. 585, 588-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
4 See In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 442 B.R. 227, 235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In a bankruptcy case, it
is ‘Bankruptcy 101’ that a debtor and its board of directors owe fiduciary duties to the debtor’s
creditors to maximize the value of the estate . . .”).















for distribution to creditors. Management is tempted by moral hazard because
self-interest can influence the answers to these questions.
In particular, managers have powerful incentives to under-appraise the firm.
It is common for managers of a firm emerging from Chapter 11 to receive
lucrative stock grants at the appraised value of the firm’s assets. If the firm is
sold, the appraised value will be the sale price. If the firm reorganizes inde-
pendently, management’s investment bankers will appraise it with a valuation
analysis that relies on financial models. As explained below, both of these
processes are subject to managerial manipulation. Senior creditors can benefit
from a low appraisal as well. They have incentives to encourage managers to
propose restructuring transactions that result in appraisals below the firm’s true
value. The losers in such transactions are junior claimants who recover less than
they would if the appraisal were accurate.
To illustrate the moral hazard problem, consider a bankrupt firm that has a
true value of $100 and owes $50 to senior creditors and $50 to junior claimants.
If the firm reorganizes in a recapitalization transaction appraised by manage-
ment’s investment banker at $50, management will receive stock options with
an exercise price of $50, making them $50 in the money from the start.
Additionally, senior creditors will receive all $100 of the firm’s value (subject
to dilution for management’s stock options) and junior claimants will receive
nothing.
Similarly, moral hazard continues to distort management’s incentives even
when the appraisal is performed through a market process such as an auction.
Managers can discourage prospective bidders, resulting in a sale price—and
hence an appraised value—that is less than what the assets would have sold for
in a fair auction process. Senior creditors often purchase the firm themselves at
a depressed price, exchanging their debt for a disproportionate ownership share
in the firm. The firm’s new owners can share their windfall with managers
through post-bankruptcy compensation and stock grants.
Junior activists believe their intervention in the restructuring process con-
strains the ability of managers and senior creditors to abuse bankruptcy law. In
Chapter 11, managers must obtain judicial approval for all major business
decisions, which allows junior activists to gain bargaining leverage by filing
objections to management’s motions. Junior activists do many other things
in the shadow of their objections. They often hire their own investment bankers
to conduct an independent analysis of the firm’s assets and future prospects.
They identify and put forward alternative transactions that would yield a higher
recovery for junior claimants. They lobby management to pursue the highest
valued restructuring transaction with an accurate appraisal. If lobbying fails,
they inform the judge that management is abusing Chapter 11 and file motions
seeking judicial relief. Far from rent seeking, junior activists believe their actions















promote the bankruptcy policy goals of maximizing creditor recoveries and
distributing firm value in line with pre-bankruptcy entitlements.
In this article, I seek to move this policy debate beyond feuding anecdotes
by performing the first comprehensive empirical study of junior activism.
This question goes to the heart of the efficacy of the bankruptcy code.
Congress created an adversarial system to adjudicate the rights of claimants
of large bankrupt firms. The claims of critics of junior activism are essentially
allegations that the system of due process is being abused by opportunistic
hedge funds. In this article, I test this claim directly by looking for evidence
suggesting that, on average, junior activists appear to abuse these rights to
inflict costs and extract hold-up value. I also consider the possibility that
activist investors might use the rights of junior claimants to constrain man-
agerial moral hazard and influence the bankruptcy system in a positive way,
consistent with bankruptcy policy goals. In that case, I would expect to ob-
serve a positive relationship between junior activism and appraised transac-
tion value, which would be consistent with increased adherence to the
absolute priority rule.
My empirical strategy is to treat an observable measure —bankruptcy
litigation—as a proxy for junior activism. When junior activists intend to
influence the outcome of a restructuring, they publicly file pleadings with the
court at key moments in the case to obtain bargaining leverage. As further
explained below, I develop a novel methodology that measures bank-
ruptcy litigation to approximate the amount of resources and sustained
effort invested by a junior activist in her attempt to influence the outcome
of Chapter 11. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to study the
average observed effect of junior activists across a sizable sample of bank-
ruptcy cases. Methodologically, this article’s approach of weighting conflict-
ing predictions of the proponents and detractors of hedge fund activism is
similar to Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang (2015) study of hedge fund activism more
generally.
My major findings can be summarized as follows. First, the evidence suggests
that junior activism is positively correlated with the appraised value of the
restructuring transaction. This empirical finding is consistent with the bargain-
ing process I sometimes observed anecdotally in data collection. For example, in
some cases, the junior activist pressured management’s investment banker to
appraise the firm at a higher level. In others, the junior activist used litigation to
pressure a reluctant management team into selling the firm to a bidder whose
offer yielded a higher overall recovery for creditors compared to other alterna-
tives. Further, for a small subset of the sample, I am able to calculate the market
value of the firm on the date the firm filed for bankruptcy. This provides a
snapshot of the market’s recovery expectations before the intervention of the















junior activist in the Chapter 11 process.5 The evidence suggests that junior
activism is positively and statistically significantly correlated with the bank-
ruptcy process producing a higher appraisal than the market expected.
Second, I do not find evidence supporting the view that junior activists use
litigation to increase their likelihood of receiving an inefficient settlement from
senior creditors outside of the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule
is violated when junior claimants receive value on account of their claims and
senior claimants are not paid in full. However, I do observe settlements outside
of the absolute priority rule in 27 percent of sample cases and these settlements
could constitute payments of hold-up value. These settlements appear to be
relatively small, generally ranging from 1 to 3 percent of the appraised trans-
action value. The dollar value of these settlements also appears to be small.
Third, unsurprisingly, the evidence suggests that junior activism is associated
with higher direct bankruptcy costs. Direct bankruptcy costs are incurred in
connection with the bankruptcy proceeding itself, such as fees paid to bank-
ruptcy lawyers. Increased bankruptcy costs mean that there is less value avail-
able for distribution to creditors, potentially thwarting the bankruptcy policy
goal of maximizing creditor recovery. However, direct bankruptcy costs are
relatively small, representing only 1.3 percent of the appraised value of the
median sample firm.
Fourth, I do not observe a statistically significant relationship between junior
activism and indirect bankruptcy costs. Indirect bankruptcy costs are losses
related to the stigma of bankruptcy. For example, firms in the bankruptcy
process are said to lose sales as customers shy away from buying products
from companies whose survival prospects are in doubt. Although hard to meas-
ure, indirect bankruptcy costs are generally considered to be of greater concern
than direct bankruptcy costs.
Taken as a whole, the results are inconsistent with the claim that junior
activists successfully abuse Chapter 11. I do not find evidence of large hold-
up value payments and junior activists appear to focus their efforts on relatively
more valuable cases, inconsistent with the expectation of indiscriminate litiga-
tion.6 As the cost increases associated with junior activism appear to be
5 Note that the market’s recovery expectations would reflect the market’s belief about both the true
value of the firm as well as the likely outcome of the bankruptcy process, including a discount if the
market anticipates that management will capture value that would otherwise go to creditors.
6 This finding could be consistent with the criticism of junior activists if it appeared that they were
their influence to extract value from senior creditors by overappraising the firm. For example, if the
firm had a true value of forty and senior creditors were owed fifty, junior activists could try to force
an overappraisal of sixty. This could result in senior creditors being undercompensated as they could
receive a smaller piece of the pie than they are owed—using these numbers, they would receive their
proportionate share of the firm’s value or 50/60 * 40¼ 41.67. I examine the possibility of















relatively small, a cautious interpretation of the results refutes the conventional
wisdom that junior activists systematically exploit the bankruptcy process to
extract hold-up value.
However, none of the evidence can definitively eliminate the possibility that
the observed positive correlation between junior activism and the final appraisal
is better explained as nonrandom and savvy selection of target firms by sophis-
ticated investors. Like other studies of hedge fund activism (e.g., Brav, Jiang, &
Kim 2015), the omitted variable problem makes it impossible to come to a
strong causal conclusion that the activist investors improved the governance of
the firms they tried to influence. It does seem unlikely that junior activists
would correctly identify undervalued firms and then reduce their returns by
the millions of dollars they spend on lawyers and investment bankers to par-
ticipate in the process, but I cannot reject this hypothesis out of hand.
Nonetheless, I do find some additional evidence that undermines this pos-
sibility. I study bond and loan returns around key bankruptcy hearings and find
a positive relationship between positive returns for junior claimholders and the
presence of a junior activist, which appears to be driven by the junior activist’s
prosecution of objections to management’s motions. Further, I examine the
firms that recapitalized with supporting investment banker appraisals to look
for evidence of junior activist influence. These investment bankers calculated a
range of estimated value, with a high-, low- and mid-point estimate. I find that
the range appears to be narrower for the cases with junior activist involvement.
This is consistent with notion that junior activists contribute expertise that
reduces the randomness of the appraisal process and, together with the evidence
of higher appraisals, is broadly consistent with what we would expect if junior
activists positively influenced the governance of bankrupt firms by constraining
opportunistic underappraisal. It is also consistent with some judicial opinions
praising junior activists for helping judges improve the accuracy of their esti-
mates of the bankrupt firm’s value.7 In cases where the firm was sold, I find
evidence that the involvement of junior activists appears to be positively asso-
ciated with the sale price, controlling for observable firm characteristics.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I provide
institutional background and review the related literature. I describe the
overappraisal below and I find no supporting evidence. Instead, the market evidence suggests that, to
the extent junior activism is causally related to the appraisal, the resulting increase in the appraisal
results in the appraisal being more accurate.
7 See e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 2006) (thanking junior activists for
presenting valuation evidence that helped the court correctively distribute the debtors’ value to
creditors, with the final appraisal increasing from management’s estimate of $7 billion to $8.3 billion
to more than $11 billion).















sample in Section 2. I introduce a new methodology for operationalizing bank-
ruptcy litigation for empirical study and describe the results of the study in
Section 3. In Section 4, I test the robustness and sensitivity of the findings. I
discuss the policy ramifications of my findings in Section 5. The analysis pre-
sented in this article is both important and timely, with the American
Bankruptcy Institute currently proposing reforms that touch on the issues of
hedge funds, claims trading and secured lender control in Chapter 11. The
results in this article undermine the critics of junior activists and urges caution
to any reforms that limit the rights of junior claimants—and the hedge funds
expert in exercising those rights—to be heard in court.
1 . I N S T I T U T I O N A L B A C K G R O U N D A N D L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W
The regulatory design of Chapter 11 leaves managers in control of the firm.
Accordingly, managers have an exclusive period to present a restructuring
transaction for a vote of creditors and approval of the bankruptcy judge
(Berdan & Arnold 1984). Management can propose one of two types of trans-
actions with supporting evidence: (i) a sale transaction with evidence that the
prospective purchaser is paying the highest possible price for the asset; or (ii) a
reorganization transaction, typically supported by an investment banker’s ap-
praisal of firm value.
Managers must consider two important bankruptcy policy goals in choosing
the transaction to propose (Aghion, Hart, & Moore 1992). First, a central ob-
jective of Chapter 11 is to maximize the value of the failed firm in order to
provide creditors with the highest possible recovery. Second, Chapter 11
respects pre-bankruptcy entitlements, including creditor priority created by
contract and state law. Thus, the absolute priority rule demands that the
firm’s value be distributed to investors in accordance with the priority of
pre-bankruptcy claims.
In most cases, managers will propose a restructuring transaction after exten-
sive negotiations with creditors. The drafters of the bankruptcy code, however,
understood that consensus would not always be possible and that bankruptcy
law can be abused. Thus, the bankruptcy code requires management to submit
all important decisions to the judge for prior approval.8 For example, imagine
that management seeks to sell the firm’s assets as a going-concern to a strategic
purchaser. Management will first file a motion with the bankruptcy judge
asking for approval to sell the company. Creditors and shareholders have
broad standing to object if they believe that the sale fails to maximize creditor
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2010).















recoveries. The bankruptcy judge will resolve the dispute if the parties cannot
come to a negotiated resolution.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bargaining process in bankruptcy has
become more difficult in the past fifteen years as management now negotiates
with a new type of claimant. In the past, management would have negotiated
with banks and insurance companies or other traditional financial institutions.
Now, hedge funds specializing in distressed investing tend to sit on the other
side of the table (Goldschmid 2005; Harner 2008a,b; Lipson 2009; Baird &
Rasmussen 2010; Jiang, Li, & Wang 2012; Ayotte, Hotchkiss, and Thorburn
2013; Ivashina, Iverson, & Smith 2015). These hedge funds wield expertise in
bankruptcy and a willingness to engage in aggressive litigation. One fund’s
strategy has been described as “forc[ing] its Chapter 11 opponents to endure
protracted legal combat” (DeBord 2012). Although hedge funds buy claims
from all levels of the capital structure, they have become particularly prominent
in their capacity as holders of junior claims (Harner 2008b).
While no scientific poll has been undertaken, most observers and market
participants seem to view junior activists as rent seekers that abuse the adver-
sarial process of Chapter 11. Managers usually respond to the arrival of junior
activists by accusing them of trying to “delay the [firm’s] emergence from
[bankruptcy] to receive hold-up value for an out of the money investment.”9
Baird & Bernstein (2006) observe that junior activists can create powerful in-
centives for senior creditors to pay them settlements if they invoke their statu-
tory right to ask the judge to appraise the firm. If junior activists seek to
appraise the firm at a number that is greater than the firm’s true value,
senior creditors might end up receiving less than the face value of their
claims. Even if senior creditors are confident that the true value of the firm is
below the appraisal advocated by junior activists, the prospect of valuation
error by the bankruptcy judge may lead the senior creditors to offer a settle-
ment. At least some attorneys who regularly advise the managers of large bank-
rupt companies believe this settlement dynamic motivates junior activism
(Miller 2007).
The widespread perception that junior activists abuse litigation to extract
rents has had profound influence on the law and in corporate finance. Junior
activists often sit on and control statutory creditor’s committees such as the
official committee of unsecured creditors (Jiang, Li, & Wang 2012). In response,
senior creditors regularly seek – and obtain – orders from the bankruptcy court
that limit the ability of the lawyers representing these committees to be
9 Debtors’ Omnibus Response to Objections to Confirmation of the Debtors’ First Modified Joint
Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 3, No. 09-13125 (Bankr.
D. Del. November 2, 2009).















reimbursed for litigation with senior creditors.10 Investment banks have also
tried to eliminate the perceived problems with opportunistic junior activists at
its source. Some junior loans now include contractual structures in which
junior claimants agree ex ante to refrain from filing objections in bankruptcy
court (Seife 2004; Chambelee 2008; Friedman, Whitney, & Sambur 2012). This
leaves junior activists with fewer options in their toolkit if they later buy the
debt in the secondary market.
For their part, however, junior activists often describe themselves as standing
against “orchestrated efforts to enrich [senior creditors] and current and former
management at the expense of [junior claimants].”11 Although managers of
Chapter 11 debtors have a fiduciary duty to maximize creditor recoveries,
they confront perverse incentives as they can profit personally by appraising
the firm at a discount to its true value. Managers often receive stock options in
the reorganized firm. Consequently, they have an incentive to have the firm
appraised at a low price, which would effectively reduce the exercise price of the
options. If managers receive stock options for 10percent of the firm at an ap-
praisal that is at a discount to the true value of the firm, they will receive a
windfall.12 Consistent with this concern, Gilson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback (2000)
find that firms are more likely to be undervalued when managers receive stock
after bankruptcy. Schwartz (1998) notes that “(i)t is widely believed that debtor
firms use their power to run their businesses and to control the reorganization
agendas to capture portions of the value that creditors are legally entitled to
receive.” When the firm is sold as a going concern, managers often receive stock
in the purchaser and lucrative employment contracts (LoPucki & Doherty
2007).
Managerial incentives to undervalue the firm are exacerbated by the domin-
ant corporate governance role of senior secured lenders in contemporary bank-
ruptcy practice (Baird & Rasmussen 2002; Skeel 2003, 2004; Warren &
Westbrook 2003; Bharath, Panchapegesan, & Werner 2010; Adler, Capkun, &
Weiss 2013). Ayotte & Morrison (2009) find that secured lenders often use their
role as liquidity provider to constrain management’s flexibility in proposing
restructuring transactions and demanding adherence to a strict schedule.
10 See e.g., In re Accuride Corp., 2009 WL 7226836, at *7 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 9, 2009).
11 In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation, 2010 WL 5489873 (Bankr. D. Del. April 6, 2010).
12 Previous generations of scholarship considered managers to be biased towards shareholders and
against creditors because they often held substantial positions in the firm’s equity. This is no longer
the prevailing dynamic in Chapter 11. Firms often arrive in bankruptcy under the control of CEOs
who are relatively new to the firm and who presumably do not hold large equity positions. Ayotte
and Morrison (2009) study a sample of firms from 2001 and find that 70% of firms filing for
bankruptcy replaced their CEO in the previous two years.















Consistent with their incentives, Gilson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback (2000) find that
senior lender control increases the likelihood that a firm will exit bankruptcy
with a low appraisal that is at a discount to its true value, implying that junior
claimants were undercompensated.
The 2009 reorganization of Visteon Corp. provides an example of how this
bargaining dynamic can play out in practice (Walsh 2011). Visteon’s managers
aligned with senior creditors against junior claimants. The judge approved
management’s deal with senior creditors over the strenuous objections of
junior activists that the appraisal was undervalued. Six months after emerging
from bankruptcy, the stock received by senior creditors was worth more than
twice the $862 million face value of their bonds and management’s stock grants
were worth $114 million. It is certainly possible that management and senior
creditors made an innocent mistake in valuing the firm, but the economics of
the transaction suggest that the two parties split value that should have gone to
junior claimholders, with senior creditors receiving more than a billion dollars
beyond their entitlements and managers receiving an enormous stock grant.
Junior claimholders were undercompensated. A former junior activist told a
reporter that “[f]rom the [senior creditors’] perspective, paying management
$114 million to facilitate this charade was a great price” (Walsh 2011).
Junior activists believe they constrain the moral hazard problem that tempts
managers to misuse Chapter 11. The restructuring transaction proposed by
management must be approved by a judge, creating an opportunity for
junior activists to exert leverage through litigation (Ayotte & Morrison
2009). The bankruptcy judge is a lawyer, not an expert in valuation, and an
activist can hire her own investment banker to explore alternative transactions,
scrutinize management’s proposal and present evidence that the proposed
transaction undervalues the firm. Junior activists can influence an appraisal
ex ante by deterring and constraining managerial misbehavior even if the bank-
ruptcy judge ultimately overrules the junior activist’s objections. If junior ac-
tivists are correct, their activities advance the bankruptcy policy goals of
maximizing creditor recoveries and respecting pre-bankruptcy entitlements.
This article is most closely related to the recent study of Jiang, Li, & Wang
(2012). They study a large sample of Chapter 11 cases to compare debtors with
and without hedge fund creditors. Their findings that are most related to this
study are that hedge fund participation on the unsecured creditors’ committee
is associated with a higher likelihood of recovery for unsecured creditors, man-
agement’s loss of the exclusive right to file a plan and CEO turnover. They
conclude that hedge funds drive efficiency gains by providing liquidity in the
form of financing, overcoming the liquidation bias of secured lenders, forcing
out bad CEOs and paying bonuses to compensate key employees.















This article departs from the Jiang, Li, & Wang (2012) study in two import-
ant ways. First, I ask a different question. I seek to understand how a specific
activist investing strategy impacts the bankruptcy policy goals of maximizing
creditor recoveries and adherence to the absolute priority rule. Second, my
empirical strategy is to develop a measure of activism as opposed to relying
on hedge fund presence as a proxy. Jiang, Li, & Wang (2012) note the meth-
odological challenge in the lack of a “systematic public data source that de-
scribe[s] hedge funds’ actual actions in court” in studying activism. I have
collected this data and provide such a systematic study and the methodology
allows me to identify the cases in which conflict between managers and junior
activists seems to have been the highest.
2 . S A M P L E C O N S T R U C T I O N A N D D A T A C O L L E C T I O N
The sample consists of corporate bankruptcies filed under Chapter 11 in a two-
year period beginning on January 1, 2009 and ending with filings on December
31, 2010. I use this sample period because the universe of large bankruptcy
filings during this time was unusually large due to the recession. Focusing on a
short period of time also allows me to hold many important but unobservable
variables constant, such as changes in the law.13 During this period, the law
surrounding the enforceability of contractual restrictions on bankruptcy litiga-
tion was unsettled, so the population of litigious junior activists was not limited
by the efforts of some firms to eliminate junior activism through loan con-
tracts.14 Additionally, many large businesses were especially fragile after their
revenue collapsed in the recession. Senior creditors might have had elevated
incentives to make hold-up payments to junior activists to protect unusually
fragile firms from losing value by lingering in bankruptcy.
I began data collection in January 2009 because LyondellBassell, the chemical
giant, filed for bankruptcy on January 6, 2009 and subsequently obtained what
was then the largest debtor-in-possession loan in history.15 This loan signaled
13 Other empirical studies in Chapter 11 that rely on hand-collected samples similarly concentrate on a
smaller period of time with many bankruptcies (for example, Ayotte and Morrison (2009) relied on
a sample from the past six months of 2001).
14 In subsequent case law, judges proved willing to enforce loan contracts that restrict junior activism.
See e.g. In re Ion Media Networks, 419 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). In practice, however, clever
lawyers constantly find new ways to get around these restrictive provisions.
15 The New York Times reported later in 2009: “When Lyondell Chemical filed for bankruptcy in
January, the restructuring world was abuzz that the company received debtor-in-possession finan-
cing at all. Eleven months later, there’s no shortage of money for companies in Chapter 11.” (De La
Merced 2009).















the reopening of the credit spigot for distressed firms after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the subsequent credit crunch that made it impossible
for large firms to borrow at any price. This, in turn, enabled many large firms to
line up the financing they needed to file for Chapter 11 relief.
I identified my sample firms from a list of large corporate bankruptcies
maintained by New Generation Research, a common starting point for empir-
ical studies of corporate reorganization (e.g., Ayotte & Morrison 2009). I began
with their list of 253 firms in 2009 and 121 in 2010.16 I examined the court
docket of each case on PACER to determine if it met six criteria for inclusion in
this study: (i) the debtor owed debt pursuant to financial contracts (“funded
debt”) of at least $25 million, (ii) the firm had an operating asset of some kind
that needed to be reorganized, (iii) the firm sought to reorganize under Chapter
11, not liquidate under Chapter 7, (iv) the firm was financed with a capital
structure with more than one level of debt or the firm’s shareholders made a
court appearance,17 (v) the case was not prepackaged, as in those cases no
bargaining happens in bankruptcy court, and (vi) the firm’s capital structure
followed a liquidation waterfall in which all creditors have claims of different
priority against the same assets, which allows me to identify the junior claimant.
The six criteria limit the sample to the reorganizations of sizable firms in
Chapter 11. Table 1 summarizes data attrition in sample construction. The
final sample consists of 107 firms.
To the extent that Bankruptcy DataSource provides a comprehensive list of
the universe of corporate bankruptcies, the sample is the entire population of
large firms that sought to reorganize their debt under Chapter 11 in 2009 and
2010 that fit the format of the study. Table A1 of the Appendix provides a
comparison between this sample size and other recent empirical studies of
Chapter 11 debtors by legal and financial scholars.
I recorded data on each sample firm by hand. My first step was to understand
how each firm was financed and which assets were collateral of secured lenders.
The research design requires understanding the claim priority of financial
claims. I began by reviewing the declaration or affidavit supporting the bank-
ruptcy petition, which usually provided a description of the firm’s capital
16 I cross-checked this list against Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database and found it to be
complete.
17 This decision excludes 12 cases from the analysis where there is only one level of funded debt but an
official committee of unsecured creditors consisting of trade creditors plays a role in litigation. I
exclude these cases because the bargaining dynamic with trade creditors only is far different than
with financial creditors. Trade debt is typically a very small part of the capital structure and it is
plausible that junior activist hedge funds might ignore cases which do not present an opportunity for
a sizable investment. However, including these cases does not change the results.















structure.18 The firms in the sample are mostly financed by multiple financial
contracts that are designed to allow investors to take positions at different levels
of priority with different risk and return profiles. For example, BearingPoint,
the consultancy, entered bankruptcy with three distinct levels of debt: (i) $294
million in a senior secured credit facility, with a blanket lien on the firm’s assets,
(ii) $240 million in senior subordinated bonds, and (iii) $450 million in junior
subordinated bonds. The capital structure was designed to create a liquidation
waterfall, with the investors in the senior secured credit facility taking the first
$294 million in value, the senior subordinated debt holders taking the next $240
million in value and the investors in the junior subordinated bonds receiving
the next $450 million. Any remaining value would, in the event of liquidation,
belong to the company’s prepetition shareholders.
Using the information provided in the first day affidavit and the firm’s
motion to use its cash collateral as well as, in some cases, the actual debt con-
tracts, I constructed the liquidation waterfall for each firm to identify the claim
priority of each level of the capital structure. I also analyzed and recorded the
rights of the various secured creditors in the firm’s collateral and gave effect to
contractual subordination agreements. This method allowed me to model the
pre-bankruptcy capital structures of the sample firms with high precision.
After identifying the capital structure, I analyzed court documents to deter-
mine the outcome of each case. I reviewed the debtor’s motion to use cash
Table 1. Sample Construction Summary Table
Rationale for Exclusion Cases Excluded
Assets Disposed of Under Chapter 7, Not Chapter 11 36
Firm Owes Less Than $25 Million to Lenders 79
No Operating Assets to Reorganize 38
Insufficient Information Available on Docket 20
Prepackaged Chapter 11 s 26
Failure to Fit Format of Study 21
Complex Capital Structure Lacking Clear Junior Claimant 47
The table describes the attrition in the sample from Next Generation Research’s original list of 374
firms filing for bankruptcy in 2009 and 2010. Prepackaged bankruptcies were excluded because
they lack the dynamic of in-court bargaining that is the subject of this study. In this study,
prepackaged bankruptcies were debtors who filed for Chapter 11 relief with voting on the plan
of reorganization complete and all classes of creditors supporting the plan. The firms that failed to
fit the format of the study had unique facts that made them qualitatively different from the other
bankruptcy cases. For example, the firms in this group had fictitious debt (such as when it was all
owed to the private equity owner and was a disguised equity investment that the parties to the
case treated accordingly) or main assets under the supervision of a foreign bankruptcy court.
18 I do not record information on leases.















collateral or to acquire debtor-in-possession financing, any motion to sell sub-
stantially all of the firm’s assets, the motion to approve the disclosure statement,
the disclosure statement itself and the plan of reorganization.19 Tables A2
through A4 of the Appendix provide descriptive data on the filing characteris-
tics, outcomes, and capital structures of the sample firms.
2.1 Understanding and Measuring Litigation
My research design relies on the due process regime of Chapter 11. Managers in
Chapter 11 enjoy protection from creditors and the power to take actions that
they cannot take outside of bankruptcy. In exchange for these powers, man-
agement submits to the oversight of the bankruptcy court. Any action outside
of the ordinary course of business must first be approved by the bankruptcy
court. For example, at the beginning of each bankruptcy case the debtor often
files a motion asking the court to approve debtor-in-possession financing to
fund the reorganization. Generally, the critical junctures of a bankruptcy case
are the court hearings on the debtor’s motions to finance the firm and then the
hearings on the substance of the proposed restructuring transaction. The bank-
ruptcy code provides creditors and shareholders broad standing to intervene if
they oppose a motion filed by the debtor. Thus, a junior activist who opposes
the requested financing can file a written objection with the court and argue
against it at the hearing on the motion. A junior activist can also seek extraor-
dinary relief that would take control of the process away from management.
Such relief could include the appointment of a trustee, an independent exam-
iner, an additional official committee or the termination of management’s ex-
clusive right to file a plan of reorganization.
These motions and objections are how a junior activist acquires bargaining
leverage in a bankruptcy case (Ayotte & Morrison 2009). The debtor will usually
make an effort to settle objections to avoid the risk of an adverse decision,
providing the junior activist with the ability to negotiate outside of the court-
room. Inside the courtroom, the junior activist has the opportunity to inform
the court—often with important members of management in the audience—
that the bankruptcy process is being abused and that management is seeking to
undercompensate junior claimants. Sometimes, the court sustains the objection
or grants the request for extraordinary relief. However, even if the court ultim-
ately overrules the objection or denies the request for extraordinary relief, the
19 In some cases, the debtor filed multiple motions to finance the case. I reviewed the motion that
resulted in the first final order providing the debtor with permission to use cash collateral or new
debtor-in-possession financing. Similarly, multiple iterations of plans of reorganization and disclos-
ure statements were often filed; I reviewed the disclosure statement that was solicited to creditors as
well as the plan of reorganization that was approved by the court.















act of objecting or seeking the motion may put pressure on management to
make concessions. In some cases, the judge may indicate to the debtor that she
recognizes the valid concerns of junior activists and urge a settlement. The
public nature of court hearings can place additional pressure on managers to
abandon a controversial course of action in favor of one less open to criticism
from junior activists.
In order to determine how junior activists sought to influence the bank-
ruptcy case, I reviewed the objections and requests for extraordinary relief
listed in Appendix 1.20 For each objection, I identified the moving creditor
and determined if the moving party was one of the firm’s shareholders or a
lender or bondholder under one of the firm’s debt contracts.
I identified the investors holding the firm’s debt and equity from my review
of the pleadings they filed as well as by reviewing notices of appearance and Rule
2019 disclosure statements filed with the court. After identifying all of the
investors I could, I sorted them by type to identify specialists in activist dis-
tressed investing. My methodology is similar to Jiang, Li, & Wang (2012). For
each institution, I reviewed its website and code it as “1” if it identifies itself as
either: (i) an “alternative asset manager,” or (ii) a fund following one of four
investment strategies: (a) “distressed debt,” (b) “hedge fund,” (c) “special situ-
ations,” or (d) “private equity.” For creditors without websites, I identified
whether they were an alternative asset manager by performing a web search
for the name of their fund and “hedge fund” to see if they appeared in a
specialized magazine covering the hedge fund industry. The late 2000s saw a
proliferation of investors calling themselves hedge funds (Miller 2007), and this
methodology mostly distinguishes alternative asset managers from traditional
financial institutions.21
My identification strategy is to use this information to measure junior ac-
tivism. I constructed an additive score to measure the intensity of the litigation
campaign embarked upon by junior activists to signal their disagreement with
the restructuring decisions made by management. The score has fourteen
20 In coding pleadings, I follow the conventions of bankruptcy practice. “Objections” are responsive
pleadings that do not express full support for the underlying requested relief. They are often styled as
“Objection” or “Limited Objection” or “Response” or “Joinder” to another party’s objection.
Supportive pleadings are always styled as “Statement in Support” or as a joinder to the debtor’s
motion.
21 This methodology has the potential to miscode creditors that appear to be traditional banks or
insurance companies but are, in reality, the sophisticated workout desks of large investment banks or
sophisticated investors like AIG that share the same expertise and profit motive as hedge funds and
are just as capable of activism. In practice, this is not a concern; when investment bank workout
desks take an activist role they tend to do so as members of ad hoc groups of creditors that include
hedge funds and are coded as activist investors.















equally weighted components that are described in Appendix 1. While in some
cases, other ad hoc motions may be as important as the fourteen components in
the index—such as a hearing on rejecting a particularly important contract or
entering into an investment agreement with a plan sponsor—the hearings for
the fourteen score components will always be extremely important and focusing
on these components facilitates a standardized comparison.22 As a construct,
the litigation score is inherently an imperfect measure of the underlying phe-
nomenon, so some caution is due in interpreting the results.
I calculate the litigation score using the following method. Whenever a
motion or objection is observed that is listed in Appendix 1, I determined
whether it was filed by a financial creditor and, if so, which financial claim
the litigant is holding. For example, if hedge funds holding pre-bankruptcy
junior claims file an objection to the disclosure statement, I add one point to
the litigation score for the junior activist. I added an additional point if the
request for extraordinary relief was granted or if the claimant is an activist
investor. The mere presence of an activist may have an effect on the bankruptcy
case, as activists may have specialized tools and knowledge that traditional
creditors lack.23
Intuitively, the litigation score can be understood as measuring the sustained
investment of resources by an activist in influencing the outcome of the bank-
ruptcy case. A higher score means that an activist is expending more resources
and effort over a longer period of time to influence the outcome of the case. A
lower score could indicate that the activist only attempted to influence the
outcome after critical phases of the bankruptcy case such as discussions over
financing had already passed. The norms of Chapter 11 dictate that an activist
will usually file objections at the important junctures of the case to obtain
22 One concern given my research design is that I might incorrectly confuse disputes regarding avoid-
ance actions as disputes over valuation. In practice, the major motions in the prosecution of avoid-
ance actions—motions for standing to assert avoidance claims and motions to settle the claims—are
not components of the litigation score, which focuses on motions dealing with restructuring trans-
action issues. I also identified the cases where junior activists prosecute avoidance actions and the
results do not change if I drop them from the study. The junior activist litigation strategy of
prosecuting avoidance actions is outside the scope of this article’s focus on the investment of
resources by junior activists to influence governance in Chapter 11 to maximize appraisal value
and comply with the absolute priority rule. Among other reasons, avoidance actions might require
junior activists to make arguments that the firm is worth less than management might say it is to
support a claim that the transaction giving rise to the avoidance action left the debtor insolvent
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(B)(I).
23 I include this component in the litigation score because it acts as a proxy for the things that hedge
funds and private equity funds are likely doing outside of court that traditional creditors like banks
tend not to do. In Section 4 below, I re-estimate the main results using a litigation score that does not
include this component and the results are qualitatively similar.















bargaining leverage. The activist will withdraw the written objection if the dis-
agreement with management is resolved, but it remains on the court docket for
incorporation into the litigation score. In some respects, the score is a measure
of the strength of a costly signal that is meant to communicate the intensity and
quality of an objecting party’s opposition to the way management is running
the bankruptcy case. Creditors typically hire expensive lawyers to represent
them in bankruptcy court, so each additional point is a crude measure of the
amount of money a creditor is spending.
For example, in the bankruptcy of CCS Medical, a group of hedge funds
holding second lien debt filed objections to: (i) the disclosure statement, (ii) the
plan of reorganization proposed by management, and (iii) a motion to hold an
auction of all assets. They also filed a request for the appointment of an official
committee of second lien lenders. While the legal standards for the approval of
the motions are all different, each argued that management sought to under-
value the firm in an alliance with senior creditors. Senior creditors and man-
agers responded to each objection by saying that the junior claimants were out
of the money based on their appraisal and engaging in frivolous litigation with
the goal of damaging the firm and extracting value. In rejecting these arguments
and granting the request of second lien lenders to force management to con-
sider alternative transactions, the judge observed “frankly, I think the second
lien ad hoc committee has performed to a level and spent money to a level that
has legitimized their participation.”24
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the litigation score.
3 . R E S E A R C H D E S I G N A N D R E S U L T S
In this section, I describe my research design and results. I will study the rela-
tionship between my independent variable of interest—the litigation score of
the most junior level of the capital structure—and bankruptcy outcome vari-
ables. The intuition behind this is that the most junior claimant is the one most
incentivized to use bankruptcy litigation to create or identify incremental
appraised value. These claims often trade at a very low level and present sub-
stantial upside opportunities to an activist investor who can create value or
improve the accuracy of the appraisal. By default, I use the score for the lowest
level of debt in the capital structure. However, if the litigation score of the
official committee of unsecured creditors is higher than that of the most
junior level of unsecured debt, I use the official committee’s litigation score
on the assumption that they are acting to maximize the recovery of unsecured
24 In re CCS Medical, Tr. at 38 (Bankr. D. Del. November 23, 2009).















creditors consistent with their fiduciary duties. I use equity’s litigation score if
investors that hold the firm’s prepetition stock are observed in the case, because
equity is lower on the liquidation waterfall than the lowest level of debt.25
Table 2 identifies the litigant whose score is used for the analysis and provides
summary statistics. Table 3 summarizes the observed litigation of the junior
activist.
3.1 Do Activist Investors Increase Appraised Transaction Value?
My first step is to investigate the relationship between junior activism and the
appraised value of the restructuring transaction. There are at least two ways that
an activist can increase the value of the appraised transaction consistent with
bankruptcy policy goals. First, the activist could increase the true value of the
proposed restructuring transaction by contributing expertise, providing liquid-
ity for the firm that increases the viability of a value-maximizing alternative or
by convincing the judge to force the debtor to enter into an alternative trans-
action. For example, in the bankruptcy of American Safety Razor, hedge funds
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25 I do not use equity’s score if the shareholders are observed to be the prepetition majority share-
holders. When prepetition majority shareholders appear in bankruptcy, they are most often acting to
defend themselves against legal claims based on their pre-bankruptcy ownership of the company—a
litigation strategy outside of the scope of this article.















Table 2. Identity of Junior Activist and Summary Statistics




Litigation Score Summary Statistics








46 42.99 1.78 1.61 0 0 2 3 6
Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors




18 16.82 2.55 1.38 1 1 2.5 3 6
Official Committee of
Shareholders
8 7.48 5.125 0.641 4 5 5 5.5 6
Combined Junior
Activist
107 100 2.36 1.6 0 1 2 3 6
The table displays the claimant identified as the junior activist and provides summary statistics on
the distribution of the litigation score. For example, in forty-six cases, the junior activist is a
creditor appearing on her own or as part of an ad hoc committee of several holders of the debt
with a mean litigation score of 1.78. In thirty-five cases, the junior activist is an official committee
of unsecured creditors with a mean litigation score of 2.37.
Table 3. Litigation Activity of Junior Activists
Objections to Lifecycle Motions Filed
n %
Finance Motion 35 32.71
Disclosure Statement 40 37.38
Sale Motion 18 16.82
Plan of Reorganization 21 19.63
Junior Activist Extraordinary Motions Filed Granted
n % n %
Appoint Examiner 8 7.48 1 0.93
Appoint Trustee 2 1.87 0 0.00
Terminate Exclusivity 5 4.67 1 0.93
Appoint Additional Official Committee 12 11.21 8 7.48
File Own Plan 4 3.74
Identity of Junior Activist
n %
Hedge Fund or Private Equity Firm Observed 60 56.07
The table summarizes the observed litigation behavior of the junior activist in each of the 107
sample cases. For example, in thirty-fve cases, representing 32.71% of the sample cases, the
junior activist is observed to object to the financing motion filed by management. In eight
cases, representing 7.48% of the sample cases, the junior activist sought the appointment of
an examiner and in one case the relief was granted.















holding second lien debt used litigation to force the debtor to sell itself to a
strategic purchaser for $301 million instead of allowing the first lien lenders to
close on a credit bid of $244 million. The firm was worth more as part of a
global conglomerate than it was as a standalone entity and the litigation tactics
of the junior activists allowed junior claimants to realize that value.
Alternatively, junior activists can convince the judge that management’s
proposed appraisal is low. Often, management proposes to sell the firm relying
on market evidence or an auction process to show that the proposed price is the
highest and best bid for the firm’s assets. In these cases, an activist can bring
contrary market evidence to the judge’s attention or show that the appraisal or
auction was designed to produce a low value. If management proposes to value
the firm in a standalone transaction supported by an investment banker valu-
ation, the activist can hire her own investment banker to dispute the assump-
tions relied on by management’s banker and to provide the judge with
additional market evidence. For example, in the bankruptcy of Spansion,
hedge funds holding junior claims presented testimony that the proposed trans-
action should be valued at as much as $1.4 billion and disputed the debtor’s
investment banker’s analysis. The judge concluded that the firm had a midpoint
valuation of $908 million—a $133 million increase from the debtor’s proposed
midpoint appraisal of $775 million. In cases like Spansion, the junior activist
improves the appraisal which helped distribute the firm’s value in line with the
absolute priority rule. Their actions constrained the ability of senior creditors
and managers to underappraise the firm.
My basic model of the appraised transaction value for each debtor firm D is:
ln ValueDð Þ ¼ aþ bLitigationScoreD þ dControlsD þ E ð1Þ
The dependent variable, “ValueD,” is the appraised transaction value. It is the
outcome of the bankruptcy process and the number used to determine the
recovery of creditors, not the true value of the firm as measured in an unbiased
efficient market (although it is presumably correlated with that true value).26
“LitigationScoreD” is the independent variable of interest, the litigation score of
the junior activist in each case. I would not expect to observe a statistically
significant relationship between LitigationScoreD and ValueD if junior activists
were indiscriminately litigating to extract hold-up value. Hold-up value should
be available in virtually every sample case as they nearly all involve firms whose
26 I obtained this number from different places depending on the facts of each case. If the firm’s assets
were sold outside of the plan process, I obtained the sale value from either the motions filed in
connection with the sale or the court transcript of the sale hearing. In the cases with a confirmed plan
of reorganization, I identified the plan value by reviewing the disclosure statement and any affidavits
filed in support of the plan of reorganization by the firm’s executives or investment bankers.















assets deteriorate over time. “ControlsD” is a vector of variables that account for
other possible determinants of ValueD, some relating to observable firm char-
acteristics and others that capture elements of the bargaining environment.
In Table 4, I present estimates of the relationship between junior activism and
the appraised transaction value of each restructuring transaction.27 In Model 1,
I examine only the variable of interest. In Model 2, I add control variables for
firm financial characteristics. I control for the size of the firm’s prepetition debt
owed to financial creditors, which is a proxy for the size of the firm. I also
control for the amount of higher priority debt in the firm’s capital structure to
account for heterogeneity in the capital structures of the sample firms.
In Model 3, I add control variables that incorporate information about the
bargaining environment. I control for the presence of an activist investor in a
Table 4. Junior Activist Litigation on Appraised Transaction Value



























0.388*** 0.182*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.180*** 0.179***










0.377*** 0.430*** 0.404*** 0.554*** 0.581***
(0.119) (0.124) (0.129) (0.0662) (0.0767)
Activist Investor in
Senior Claim
–0.350*** –0.314** –0.352*** –0.405***
(0.119) (0.120) (0.123) (0.145)
 HY Bond Spread 0.0231* 0.0215 0.00971 0.0101
(0.0132) (0.0172) (0.0154) (0.0204)
Delaware or SDNY
Administration
0.257** 0.238 0.104 0.0223
(0.126) (0.165) (0.139) (0.190)
Constant 18.37*** 3.781*** 3.124*** 2.458** 3.317*** 3.277**
(0.174) (1.000) (0.930) (0.993) (1.244) (1.322)
Observations 107 107 107 107 101 101
R-squared 0.229 0.825 0.846 0.860 0.851 0.856
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the logged appraised transaction value, which is either a cash sale
price or an investment banker valuation. The table displays ordinary least squares linear regres-
sions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are Fama-French 12.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
27 In unreported results, I verified the assumption of normally distributed residuals for the ordinary
least squares linear regression models with the Shapiro-Wilk test.















senior class of debt. Theoretically, senior activist investors can exacerbate
managerial moral hazard and exert downward pressure on valuation.
The sign takes on the predicted negative sign and is statistically significant,
although it is not obvious how much (if any) of this relationship is causal. I
also control for changes in credit market conditions with the Bank of America
Merrill Lynch High Yield Option Index. For each sample firm, I calculated the
difference in credit market conditions between the firm’s petition date and the
date the firm emerges from bankruptcy. A higher number indicates credit mar-
kets improved as the high-yield bond spread narrowed. Bankruptcy is highly
related to credit market conditions, so we would expect a positive association
between improvements in credit market conditions and appraised transaction
value. The control variable takes on the expected sign, but the associated stand-
ard error is large.
In Model 4, I include year and industry k-1 dummy variables to cap-
ture variation created by otherwise unobserved changes over time and across
industries. In all four of the estimations, junior activism is positively and stat-
istically significantly associated with the appraised transaction value. In
Models 5 and 6, I re-estimate Models 3 and 4 using an alternative control
variable for firm size: the firm’s balance sheet value of its assets.28 The results
are the same.
Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of the litigation score from Model 4
from Table 4. The graph can be interpreted by imagining a hypothetical firm
with control variables at the sample mean. The line represents the impact of an
additional unit of the litigation score on the appraised transaction value. As the
graph shows, each additional unit of litigation is correlated with an incremen-
tally higher appraisal.
The positive association between appraised transaction value and junior ac-
tivism is interesting, but it cannot establish a causal relationship in and of itself.
Junior activists are not randomly assigned to bankruptcy cases. Table 4 controls
for observeable characteristics relating to the firm’s balance sheet and it is
possible, for example, that an omitted variable is the real cause of observed
28 I obtained the asset value from the bankruptcy petition when the debtor provided it. If the debtor
did not estimate its asset value on the petition, I obtained it from the statements and schedules filed
with the court or from a financial statement attached to a pleading such as a motion to approve the
use of cash collateral. I used the earliest asset value provided by the debtor the bankruptcy court. I
prefer funded debt as the measure of firm value because the amount owed to creditors is less subject
to manipulation than balance sheet data. Firms often write down asset value once they fall into
distress, and there is variation in the sample between firms that took write downs prior to bank-
ruptcy and those who did so while in Chapter 11. Funded debt also has a higher correlation coef-
ficient (0.9544) with the appraised transaction value than asset value (0.8554), suggesting it is a
better control for firm value.















positive association between the appraisal and the investment of resources by
junior activists. The appraisal is usually the outcome of some sort of bargaining
process and the ideal control variable for proving causation would be the first
offer that management (or senior creditors) make to junior activists in a con-
ference room in Manhattan. This number is not observeable in an empirical
research design.
However, for 33 of the 107 cases in the sample, I was able to obtain trading
prices of the firm’s outstanding debt claims on the date the firm filed for
bankruptcy from MarkIt, TRACE, and Datastream. For 18 of the 107 cases, I
was also able to obtain the trading value of the firm’s outstanding equity
claims.29 I use this to calculate the implied market value of the firm at the
Figure 2. Litigation score on appraised transaction value.
The figure displays the marginal effect of an increase in litigation on the appraised
transaction value, holding all other controls constant at their sample mean value. The
dependent variable is the appraised transaction value, either from a cash sale or a
valuation supporting the plan of reorganization implemented by each debtor. The in-
dependent variable of interest is the litigation score. The line depicts the marginal
effects from the ordinary least squares linear estimation of Model 4 in Table 4 with
full controls and industry and year fixed effects. The red dots represent sample firms and
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Marginal Effects of Changes in the Litigation Score
29 Of the thirty-three cases with available debt pricing information, nine were owned by private equity
sponsors, two were owned by families and three others did not seem to trade publicly around the
time the firm filed for bankruptcy. I was able to obtain the full debt and equity market value for the















beginning of the bankruptcy case, which is a crude proxy for the parties’ starting
bargaining positions. In Table 5, I control for the market’s recovery expect-
ations prior to the negotiations, litigation, and other developments that
occurred in the bankruptcy process. The dependent variable in the regressions
is the appraisal. The models are the same as those in Table 4. The small sample
Table 5. Junior Activist Litigation on Appraised Transaction Value





















Litigation Score of Junior
Activist
0.270*** 0.117** 0.164*** 0.137** 0.179**
(0.0719) (0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0595) (0.0599)
Log Market Value of Firm
Implied by Trading




Log Market Value of Firm
on Petition Date
Implied by the Trading




Log Amount of Debt in
Capital Structure With
Absolute Priority Over
Claim Held by Junior
Activist
0.456*** 0.460*** 0.328* 0.376**
(0.125) (0.138) (0.166) (0.146)










Constant 19.51*** 3.833* 3.269* 2.934 1.925
(0.252) (1.984) (1.735) (2.108) (2.465)
Observations 31 31 31 18 18
R-squared 0.199 0.846 0.883 0.896 0.913
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No
The dependent variable is the appraised transaction value, which is either a cash sale price or an
investment banker valuation. The table displays ordinary least squares linear regressions. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
remaining eighteen firms. In Table 9, I estimate models using both the debt and the full market value
pricing data to avoid the bias of excluding privately owned firms. The results are consistent using
both methods, which is expected given the small relative value of the outstanding public equity for
the firms for which this information is available.















size urges caution in interpreting the results, but junior activism remains posi-
tively and statistically significantly associated with the appraisal even after con-
trolling for improvements in market conditions.
This analysis cannot eliminate the possibility that the junior activists merely
selected cases that produced unusually high recoveries and did not contribute to
the outcome. I studied the market data more closely to look for evidence that
the skill of junior activists might have contributed to the surprisingly high
appraisals, as opposed to savvy case selection or an omitted variable. The
nature of the task—incomplete data and thin markets—make this exercise
challenging and I cannot systematically observe, for example, the point in
time at which the junior activist acquired its position and first intervened in
governance. I focused my analysis on two important court hearings that are
components of the litigation score: the hearing on the firm’s use of debtor-in-
possession financing or cash collateral, which usually occurs early in the bank-
ruptcy process, and the hearing on the debtor’s disclosure statement, which
usually occurs towards the middle or end of the process. Junior activists often
use both hearings to file a legal objection and gain bargaining leverage and
counter the influence of senior creditors.
I focus my analysis on the market reaction to the judge entering an order that
either: (i) approves the terms of the debtor’s financing or use of cash collateral,
or (ii) approves a disclosure statement for solicitation. For each relevant date in
my sample, I calculated the return a hypothetical investor would have earned by
buying the claim the day before the relevant order and selling it the day after the
order. The orders were nearly always entered on the same day as the court
hearing at which the junior activist’s complaints might have been heard. In
theory, this analysis might isolate the impact of a junior activist who objects to
the debtor’s motion. For each order date, day, I calculate the following test





The data are complete enough to identify before-and-after pricing information
for 209 debt claims issued by 59 distinct debtors.
If junior activists have a causal impact on the bankruptcy process, we would
expect them to gain influence through the judicial process. If the association
observed in Table 5 above is merely correlative, we would expect any observed
positive returns to be independent of whether or not junior activists deployed
their litigation skills. We might also expect not to find any relationship at all, as
the market may very well anticipate the influence of junior activists and the
judge’s ruling. If the association observed in Table 6 is causal, we would expect















to observe positive returns for junior claimants after they deployed their ex-
pertise in litigation.
Table 6 displays regression analysis of the bond and loan returns at these
critical junctures of the bankruptcy process. The dependent variable is retorder .
In Model 1, I regress a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the junior
activist objects to the motion on retorder . In the second estimation, I add a dummy
variable which takes on a value of 1 if the debt claim is junior in the sample firm’s
capital structure and a third dummy which takes on a value of 1 if an activist
investor is observed holding the junior claim. The activist investor dummy is
positively and statistically significantly associated with the claim’s return. In
Model 4, I add a three-way interaction term which takes on a value of 1 when
the claim is a junior claim, an activist investor is observed holding the junior
claim and the activist investor prosecuted a written objection at the relevant
Table 6. Junior Activism and Debt Returns after Key Bankruptcy Court Hearings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Return Return Return Return Return Return
Objection to Motion –0.00837 –0.00211 0.00903 –0.00323 0.00523 0.0101
(0.0218) (0.0215) (0.00806) (0.00648) (0.0136) (0.0198)
Junior Claim –0.00126 0.00476 0.00276 0.00480 0.000540
(0.0130) (0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0155) (0.0191)
Objection x Junior –0.0159 –0.0924** –0.0936** –0.0964**
(0.0313) (0.0427) (0.0442) (0.0447)
Activist Investor Observed
in Junior Claim
0.0449** 0.0452** –0.00626 –0.0130 –0.0146
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.00567) (0.00821) (0.0162)
Junior Claim x Activist
Investor in Junior Claim
0.00960 0.00936 0.0148
(0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0207)
Objection to Motion x




Junior Claim x Activist










Constant –0.0083 –0.0176 –0.0219* 0.00767 –0.305** –0.175
(0.02181) (0.0136) (0.0118) (0.00554) (0.138) (0.170)
Observations 209 209 209 209 206 206
R-squared 0.0010 0.029 0.030 0.101 0.110 0.148
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
The dependent variable is the return earned by an investor who bought the claim the day before
the Court entered an order approving a debtor’s financing package or a disclosure statement for
a plan of reorganization. The table displays ordinary least squares regression with standard errors
in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are Fama-French 12. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.















hearing. This interaction term takes on a positive and statistically significant
relationship with the return and the associational variable—the mere presence
of an activist investor—loses its statistical significance. This result is consistent
with the view that junior activists influence the bankruptcy process by using both
their skill at identifying good investment opportunities as well as their expertise
in influencing the bankruptcy process in favor of higher recoveries.30
I look for further evidence of the impact of junior activists in a subset of the
sample in which the plan of reorganization relied on an investment banker’s
appraisal of the firm. In most of these cases, the investment banker calculated a
range of potential appraisal values, with a high, low, and mid-point number. I
observe the presence of a junior activist in twenty-nine of these forty-seven
cases. I analyze this data by calculating a test statistic that captures the size of the





where ValuationHD;ValuationLD; and ValuationMD represent the high, low, and
midpoint of the valuation range, respectively. In unreported results, I find that
the presence of a junior activist is stastistically significantly associated with
reduced valuation uncertainty. This is consistent with the empirical prediction
that junior activists contribute expertise that constrain the ability of manage-
ment to underappraise the firm.
One potential confounding variable untouched by this analysis is possible
that junior activists are simply attracted to cases with valuation uncertainty and
those cases also happen to be the highest valued cases. For example, a company
with hard-to-value intellectual property assets might be more likely to attract
junior activists than a company whose assets are easily valued in a liquid
market. There are at least three reasons to doubt that this potential selection
effect explains the results. First, as a theoretical matter, the selection method-
ology for the sample means that the sample consists only of large firms with
substantial-going concern value. One might predict that, all things being equal,
firms with relatively less valuation uncertainty would be more likely than those
with difficult to value assets to come to a Coasean bargain and do an out-of-
court restructuring or prepackaged bankruptcy, both of which are out of the
scope of this study. Second, as an empirical matter, in fifty of the sixty-one cases
involved a reorganization through an appraisal process, the debtor also
30 In unreported results, I tested the possibility that these results were driven by random market
fluctuations by subtracting the return of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch High Yield Bond
Index, as in Wang (2011) and using that as the dependent variable instead. The results were
unchanged.















estimated the liquidation value of the firm’s assets, a rough proxy for the
amount that could be realized from a controlled fire sale of the firm’s
assets.31 One would expect the liquidation value of the asssets to be higher
when the assets are easier to value, all things being equal. The number ranges
from 80 percent of the appraisal to 99.8 percent, with a mean of 95.8 percent,
suggesting that the vast majority of appraised value in each case might represent
going-concern value, not easy-to-value liquid assets.
Third, I computed a test static, FVD, that measures the point in the bank-
ruptcy case (as measured by the number of days of bankruptcy) have elapsed
before each financial claim in the sample is “fully valued,” meaning that it
begins to be bought and sold in the market for the same price it can be
bought and sold for on the plan of reorganization’s effective date. For example,
if ninety days elapse between the petition date and the effective date and the first
lien debt is trading for sixty cents on the dollar as of the effective date then the
relevant date for computing FVD is the first day that the debt begins trading for
sixty cents. If the debt first trades at sixty cents on the 60th day of the case, FVD
is 66.66 percent. In other words, FVD measures the percentage of the case that
has elapsed before a trader can sell the claim for the value of its ultimate
recovery through the bankruptcy process. I calculated FVD for the 155 financial
claims from 72 cases that I could track through the entire bankruptcy process. I
found that, on average, the mean FVD for the entire sample was 72.4 percent. I
bifurcated the sample into two groups, consisting of cases with an observed
junior activist (eighty-two claims from thirty-five unique cases) and those with-
out an observed junior activist (seventy-three unique claims from thirty-seven
unique cases). I find that the observed sample mean FVD of the junior activist
influenced claims is slightly higher (75 percent vsersus69 percent), but the
difference is relatively small and a Kolgorov–Smirnov test fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same underlying popula-
tion using conventional levels of statistical significance.
3.2 Do Activist Investors Use Litigation to Extract Settlements in Violation of the
Absolute Priority Rule?
Next, I consider the possibility that junior activists abuse the rights of Chapter
11 creditors to extract rents. I analyze this claim empirically by focusing on
cases where the junior claimant receives a claim outside of the contours of the
absolute priority rule. These payments could be hold-up payments to junior
31 This analysis is performed in connection with the “best interests of creditors” test under Section
1129 of the bankruptcy code.















activists from senior creditors. My methodology for identifying violations of the
absolute priority rule is as follows.
First, I examine each case in the sample and compute a binary dummy variable,
“APRViolationD.” that takes on a value of 1 if the lowest level of the capital
structure receives a distribution and any senior claim is not paid in full. I describe
my methodology for identifying violations of the absolute priority rule in greater
detail in the Appendix, but my approach is to use detailed capital structure
models to identify absolute priority rule violations with precision. After identify-
ing absolute priority rule violations, I use simple logistic regression to estimate the
likelihood of an absolute priority rule violation for each debtor firm D, controlling
for factors relating to the bargaining environment and firm characteristics:




In Table 7, I present estimates of Equation 4 to examine the relationship
between junior activism and the likelihood of violations of the absolute priority
rule. In Model 2, I add control variables for heterogeneity in the capital struc-
tures of sample firms, venue, and credit market conditions. In Model 3, I add
industry and year fixed effects. The results of the three estimations are the same:
I do not find a statistically significant association between litigation and the
likelihood of an absolute priority rule violation. In Models 4 through 6, I limit
the sample to a subsample in which the junior activist received a recovery and
the results are the same.
There are at least three possible explanations for this non-finding. First,
senior creditors may dominate the bankruptcy process to the point that they
are able to eliminate any option value that junior activists might capture by
threatening to delay the bankruptcy case. Second, my sample size may be too
small to identify a relationship that would be evident in a larger sample.
Alternatively, a research design that relies on litigation as a proxy for junior
activism may not be able to capture settlements that are paid to avoid litigation
in the first instance. For example, the junior activist may have threatened liti-
gation and received a settlement to pacify her. As nothing was filed with the
judge, I do not observe those efforts.
As I cannot eliminate the possibility that the twenty-nine observed payments
outside of the absolute priority rule constitute hold-up value, I studied them
closely to learn more about what hold-up value might be worth. The debtors
either estimate the recovery for the out of the money class or provide enough
information to estimate it independently in eighteen of the twenty-nine cases
with absolute priority rule violations. Table 8 displays a summary of that in-
formation. As the Table shows, in all but one extreme case—a distribution of















approximately $100 million in the Chapter 11 case of Smurfit-Stone, where
management accepted the arguments of junior activists that they had under-
appraised the firm but settled it outside of the absolute priority rule for pro-
cedural reasons—the value distributed in violation of the absolute priority rule
is relatively small, representing a range of 0.27–7.50 percent of total enterprise
value. Without the Smurfit-Stone case, the range runs from roughly 1 percent
to roughly 3 percent of total enterprise value, ascribing no value to the out of
the money warrants. In no case does the amount of value distributed to the
lowest claimant exceed 1 percent of the face value of the ex ante debt structure.
3.3 Do Junior Activist Investors Use Litigation to Undercompensate
Senior Creditors?
One explanation for the surprisingly small hold-up value payments could be
that junior activists are successfully obtaining court orders that extract rents
through an alternative channel that appears to comply with the absolute
Table 7. Junior Activist Litigation on Violations of the Absolute Priority Rule













Litigation Score of Junior
Activist
0.155 0.086 0.043 0.092 –0.069 –0.055
(0.129) (0.157) (0.199) (0.154) (0.200) (0.290)
Percentage of Funded
Debt Senior to Maximum
Level
0.897 1.323 2.272** 4.214***
(0.947) (1.120) (1.070) (1.588)
Delaware or SDNY
Administration
1.819** 2.399** 2.093** 3.439**
(0.780) (0.992) (0.891) (1.488)
BAML HY Option Index on
Date Exit Bankruptcy
–0.129 0.044 –0.223 –0.055
(0.148) (0.211) (0.176) (0.268)
Constant –1.371*** –2.513 –4.348** –0.505 –2.229 –5.073*
(0.385) (1.599) (2.080) (0.458) (1.918) (2.728)
Psuedo R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.31
Observations 107 107 100 67 67 63
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
The dependent variable is a binary dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the absolute
priority rule was violated. Violations of the absolute priority rule occur when junior claimholders
receive a recovery and senior claimholders are not paid in full. The table displays logistic regres-
sion analysis with standard errors in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are Fama-French 12. In the
first three columns, I estimate the models over the entire dataset, where the dependent variable
equals one where the junior claimant received a distribution outside of the absolute priority rule
and zero otherwise. In these models, APRViolationD¼ 0 if the junior claimant received no distri-
bution or if a distribution was received outside of the absolute priority rule. Columns (4) through
(6) limit the sample to the cases where APRViolationD¼ 0 if the junior activist received a distri-
bution outside of the absolute priority to guard against bias that might be created by including
the no distribution cases. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.















priority rule. If the firm is appraised at a higher level than its true value, senior
creditors may be undercompensated (Gilson 1995). This is simply a different
channel for rent extraction. Imagine a firm with two creditors, Senior and
Junior, who are each owed fifty. If the firm’s true value is fifty, and junior
activists convince the judge that the firm is worth eighty, senior creditors
may receive consideration worth less than the face value of their claim.32
I use four methods to learn more about the relationship between junior
activism and the treatment of senior creditors in bankruptcy. First, I look for
information based on the behavior of senior creditors in the bankruptcy case. I
create a binary dummy variable, “SeniorObjectionD,” that is equal to 1 if a
senior creditor files an objection to the plan of reorganization. I use simple
logistic regression to estimate the following equation, controlling for factors





1þ eðaþ b LitigationScoreDþ d ControlsDÞ
ð5Þ
Table 8. Estimated Value of Distributions Outside of Absolute Priority in Favor of
Junior Activist
Consideration Estimated Value




Value of Cash (n¼ 5) 900,000 11,000,000 6,380,000 7,000,000 3,615,522
% TEV (n¼ 5) 1.00 4.80 3.02 2.43 1.73
% Funded Debt (n¼ 5) 0.50 2.50 1.50 1.30 0.70
Equity (n¼ 10)*
Value of Equity (n¼ 9) 1,240,000 99,400,000 24,000,000 4,386,000 33,900,000
% Reorganized Equity (n¼ 10) 1.00 7.50 3.75 3.50 2.12
% TEV (n¼ 9) 0.27 3.15 1.92 1.69 1.15
% Funded Debt (n¼ 9) 0.18 2.86 1.37 1.45 0.89
This table displays the estimated value of the payments that junior activists received outside of
the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule was violated in 29 of the 107 sample cases
and I cannot calculate the equity value in 3 cases.
*In 6 cases, warrants and equity were distributed outside of the absolute priority rule so the total
value of the distribution is higher.
32 A senior creditor will not be undercompensated if they receive cash. However, the bankruptcy code
allows senior creditors to be “crammed down” and forced to accept new debt with a below market
interest rate that is worth less than the face value of their claims on the open market.















In unreported results, I do not find a statistically significant relationship
between junior activism and the likelihood that senior creditors publicly com-
plain about the way the plan treats their claims. However, this leaves open the
possibility that senior creditors consent to overappraisals as a way of paying
rents to junior activists. To test this, I obtained trading prices to estimate the
firm’s market value on the date the firm exits bankruptcy to compare the
market’s view of creditor recoveries with the estimates found in the disclosure
statement for the confirmed plan. I was able to find sufficient observations to
estimate the market’s view of the bankruptcy deal in eighteen of the sample
cases.
In Figure 3, I graph the ratio of the market value of the creditor recoveries as
compared to the appraised transaction value. The observations in the lower
shaded region imply that creditors were undercompensated relative to what the
plan said it provided. The evidence does not support the view that junior ac-
tivists successfully extract rents by overappraising the firm. In fact, in some of
the cases where the litigation score is high, senior creditors still appear to have
been overpaid. Moreover, the results for Models 1 through 3 in Table 4 are the
same if I limit the sample to the thirty-nine cases where the firm was sold for
cash to a third party. In those cases, senior creditors could not have been
undercompensated and junior activism remains positively correlated with the
sale price, providing additional comfort that junior activists are not extracting
rents from senior creditors.
Finally, I examined the trading prices of the senior claims around the hear-
ings measured above and I looked for evidence of negative changes in the
trading price of the senior claims at the same time that the trading value of
the junior claim improved. I was able to identify seventeen senior claims where
I could also track the pricing change of the junior claim. I found no systematic
relationship suggesting that a positive return to the junior claim constituted a
transfer of value from senior claimholders. I also examined a larger sample
of ninety senior claims around these two critical hearing dates and found
that the senior claim fell in value subsequent to an order about 21 percent of
the time when a junior activist objected to the motion ex ante and about 20
percent of the time when the junior activist had not objected to the motion ex
ante. In sum, the available trading data do not support the hypothesis that
junior activists used litigation to transfer value to themselves from senior
claimants.33
33 For comparison’s sake, when an activist investor files an objection, the post-order return to the
junior claim is positive slightly less than 50% of the time, as opposed to 34% of the time when no
junior activist objects to the debtor’s motion, consistent with the results in Table 6.















Figure 3. Market value of creditors recoveries compared to projected recoveries.
The figure displays the ratio of the market value of recoveries to the projected recov-
eries from each case’s disclosure statement for eighteen sample firms graphed against
the litigation score. A ratio of one would indicate the market value was equal to the
appraised value of the firm, and the area between the two-shaded regions contains
observations that are likely within the “valuation range” of the appraisals of each
case. In other words, those cases seem to be fairly valued. The shaded region at the
top captures the cases in which the trading prices of the firm’s debt implies that senior
creditors were overcompensated relative to management’s investment banker’s valu-
ation. The shaded region at the bottom of the graph contains the cases in which the
trading prices of the firm’s debt implies that creditors were undercompensated. For
example, the graph shows that for the four observations with a litigation score of
four, two observations are right around one, suggesting that the market thought that
firm was fairly valued. The other two observations are in the top shaded region and
imply that the market thinks the firm was worth more than the disclosure statement
suggested and that senior creditors were overcompensated in those two cases.















3.4 Do Junior Activist Investors Increase Bankruptcy Costs?
Junior activists are often criticized for engaging in meritless litigation that
causes large increases in bankruptcy costs that diminish creditor recoveries
and makes Chapter 11 less attractive to businesses that need to reorganize
(Ross 2013). The literature (e.g., Bris, Welch, & Zhu 2006; LoPucki &
Doherty 2011; Lubben 2012) regularly considers two types of bankruptcy
costs: direct bankruptcy costs, the fees paid to lawyers, and other advisors to
navigate Chapter 11, and indirect bankruptcy costs, the harm to the assets
caused by the stigma of bankruptcy. I consider each in turn using common
methodology in the bankruptcy costs literature.
3.4.1 Direct Bankruptcy Costs
First, I use the fees and expenses requested by the debtor’s main counsel as my
dependent variable to estimate the effect of junior activism on direct bank-
ruptcy costs. I obtain these fees from the final fee application filed in the bank-
ruptcy court. This is only a portion of the direct cost of Chapter 11 as debtors
also regularly hire accountants, investment bankers, and specialized restructur-
ing advisors. They also hire additional bankruptcy lawyers (local counsel or
conflicts counsel, for example) and sometimes lawyers to handle discrete tasks
such as providing specialized advice unrelated to the bankruptcy or document-
ing the restructuring transactions if the bankruptcy lawyers are able to do so less
efficiently. I use the fees of the main counsel as these are the fees that are likely
elastic with respect to bankruptcy litigation. The main bankruptcy counsel
typically handles all bankruptcy litigation. Investment bankers are normally
paid monthly fees with success bonus arrangements, neither of which varies
directly with motions filed in court. LoPucki & Doherty (2011) examine a
sample of 102 large bankruptcy cases and find that the lead counsel accounts
for 92 percent of total fees charged by lawyers providing bankruptcy advice to
the firm in Chapter 11.34
If junior activist investors have a substantive impact on a bankruptcy case, it
would likely increase direct bankruptcy costs. Motions and objections filed by
junior activists require the debtor’s attorneys to produce documents, research
34 I do not include any measure of creditor expenses in my regressions, although other studies such as
LoPucki and Doherty (2011) consider the fees charged by statutory creditors’ committees. I exclude
these fees because the firms in this sample have many creditors and creditors’ committees play
different roles depending on specific facts. In some cases, creditors’ committees are led by activist
investors and engage in aggressive litigation. In others, creditors’ committees are largely spectators
to a conflict between activist investors who hire their own lawyers in bankruptcy court. Moreover,
we do not systematically observe the professional fees of creditors who receive payment either
pursuant to settlements or as part of adequate protection for secured lenders. This means that
part of the creditor data is almost always missing.















legal theories, and write responses. Challenges to corporate actions may prompt
the debtor’s lawyers to spend extended periods of time advising the board of
directors on how to respond. Stubborn junior activists may cause the debtor’s
lawyers to spend additional time negotiating and planning strategy.35 As large
debtors tend to employ the largest and priciest law firms, these actions would be
expensive.
I estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares regression to
learn more about the relationship between junior activism and the direct costs
of Chapter 11, controlling for firm and bankruptcy characteristics that LoPucki
& Doherty (2011) found to explain bankruptcy costs:
ln DirectCostsDð Þ ¼ aþ bLitigationScoreD þ dControlsD þ E ð6Þ
Table 9 shows the observed impact of litigation on direct bankruptcy costs.
Junior activism appears to be positively and statistically significantly associated
with direct bankruptcy costs, even after controlling for industry and year fixed
effects. Figure 4 below displays the marginal effects of activism on direct bank-
ruptcy costs from Model 3 of Table 9.
The second-order question is the magnitude of the cost increase associated
with junior activism. Model 3 from Table 9 suggests that a one unit increase in
the junior activist litigation score is associated with a 20 percent increase in
observed direct bankruptcy costs, controlling for other characteristics import-
ant for bankruptcy costs. Model 4 from Table 9 suggests that junior activism is
associated with a 19 percent increase in appraised transaction value, controlling
for other characteristics important for firm value.36 To contextualize these
numbers, consider the median sample case of Aventine Renewable Energy
Holdings, a firm with approximately $355 million in debt prior to the bank-
ruptcy that reorganized in a transaction appraised at approximately $269 mil-
lion at the cost of $1.9 million in attorney’s fees. My methodology implies that a
one unit increase in litigation would amount to a $51 million increase in
appraised transaction value and a $380,000 increase in direct bankruptcy costs.
This analysis requires an important qualification. These results do not sug-
gest that junior activists need only file a motion and the appraisal will be
summarily boosted by $54 million at a low cost. They do, however, suggest
that in very large cases, the amount of value on the table is such that increases in
35 This result also suggests a potential explanation for the criticism of junior activism. My sample
indicates there is very little overlap between the law firms that represent junior activists and the firms
that regularly represent debtors and senior creditors, suggesting that many leading bankruptcy
lawyers see their clients struggle with the costs created by junior activists without also representing
the parties that internalize the benefits of junior activism.
36 The similarity between the two coefficient estimates is coincidental.















direct bankruptcy cost are relatively small. Although I do not observe all pos-
sible direct bankruptcy costs, unobserved costs are unlikely to make up the two
order of magnitude difference between observed direct costs and the potential
increase in value associated with junior activism.
3.4.2 Indirect Bankruptcy Costs
I follow the convention in the literature (Franks & Torous 1989; Thorburn
2000; Bris, Welch, & Zhu 2006) and use the number of days a firm remains
in bankruptcy as a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs. This is an imperfect
proxy for harder-to-observe costs such as lost sales and profits due to adverse
publicity arising from the bankruptcy filing and the distraction of managers
from pursuing value accretive tasks and the inability to pursue new business as
the firm reorganizes. Altman (1984) finds indirect bankruptcy costs to be sig-
nificantly larger in magnitude than direct bankruptcy costs and Maksimovic &
Table 9. Junior Activist Litigation on Direct and Indirect Bankruptcy Costs





















0.316*** 0.161*** 0.204*** 0.174*** 0.0592 0.0310
(0.0541) (0.0512) (0.0507) (0.0458) (0.0384) (0.0347)
Log Outstanding Debt 0.438*** 0.438*** 0.200*** 0.154***







0.120 –0.0898 0.977*** 0.986***
(0.194) (0.187) (0.161) (0.169)
Prenegotiated Filing –0.808*** –0.610*** –0.752*** –0.627***
(0.155) (0.152) (0.104) (0.106)
Delaware or SDNY
Administration
0.0287 –0.224 –0.254** –0.346***
(0.147) (0.168) (0.128) (0.108)
Constant 14.30*** 5.658*** 7.563*** 4.819*** 0.960 2.890***
(0.144) (1.016) (1.113) (0.150) (0.786) (0.888)
Observations 105 105 105 107 107 107
R-squared 0.219 0.616 0.752 0.112 0.542 0.675
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
The dependent variable in Models 1 through 3 is the logged amount of fees and expenses
requested by the debtor’s main bankruptcy counsel in their final fee application. The dependent
variable in Models 4 through 6 is the logged number of days that the firm’s assets are under
bankruptcy court administration, measured from the day the firm files a bankruptcy petition to
the date a firm exits bankruptcy either through a plan of reorganization becoming effective or a
sale being consummated. The table displays ordinary least squares linear regressions with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are Fama-French 12.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.















Phillips (1998) argue that indirect bankruptcy costs are more important than
direct bankruptcy costs.
Junior activists have the due process rights provided to them by the bank-
ruptcy code. This allows them to insist on additional time to analyze a proposed
restructuring transaction. Once the analysis is done, the junior activist can delay
a judge’s decision on a motion by cross-examining witnesses as well as putting
forth their own witnesses and evidence about the inadequacy of the proposed
transaction. All of these things take time and could cause a bankruptcy case to
take longer than managers or secured creditors might prefer.
The power to inflict delay could have implications consistent with the state-
ments of junior activists as well as their detractors. For example, delay could
give the debtor the necessary time to explore value-maximizing restructuring
alternatives. This would be consistent with bankruptcy policy goals. However,
from a darker perspective, junior activists have strong incentives to litigate
strategically. For opportunistic hedge funds, claims that are truly out of the
Figure 4. Litigation score on direct bankruptcy costs.
The figure displays the marginal effect of an increase in litigation on direct bankruptcy
costs, holding all other controls constant at their sample mean value. The dependent
variable is the total amount of fees sought by the debtor’s main bankruptcy counsel in
their final fee application to the bankruptcy court. The independent variable of interest
is the litigation score. The graph depicts the marginal effects from the ordinary least
squares linear estimation of Model 3 in Table 9 with full controls and industry and year
fixed effects. The red dots represent sample firms and are overlaid on the marginal
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money in an unbiased valuation may still present option value. A junior activist
could simply litigate to delay the day of reckoning in hopes that business con-
ditions improve and the firm’s value increases to the point that its claim is in the
money (White 2004). A junior activist could also use litigation to threaten
delay, knowing that such delay would harm the true value of the firm and
that senior creditors will offer inefficient settlements to preserve firm value
(Betker 1995). I will use ordinary least squares linear regression to analyze




¼ aþ bLitigationScoreD þ dControlsD þ E ð7Þ
I estimate Equation 5 in Models 4 through 6 of Table 9. I find a statistically
significant and positive relationship between junior activism and the duration of
the bankruptcy case in Model 4, with no control variables. However, once control
variables are added, the relationship seems to disappear in Models 5 and 6.
4 . R O B U S T N E S S A N D S E N S I T I V I T Y A N A L Y S I S
In this section, I conduct a variety of robustness checks to examine the sensi-
tivity of the results to alternative specifications.37 First, given the small sample
size, it is possible that outliers influence the results. To investigate this possi-
bility, I ran the ordinary least squares regression estimations from Tables 4 and
9 using quintile (median) regression. This approach can mitigate the influence
of outliers. The results for the regressions on appraised transaction value and
direct bankruptcy costs are robust to the use of quintile regression.
Second, I examine the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions underlying
the litigation score. I consider the possibility of measurement error in the way
the components of the score are observed. I recalculate the litigation score
including only pleadings longer than five pages. This limits the score to legal
documents that are more likely to make substantive legal arguments. The results
remain statistically significant and qualitatively similar.
Third, I test the sensitivity of the results to the way the litigation score is
constructed. I first recalculated the litigation score without providing the junior
activist any points for obtaining judicial rulings. The results were the same for
both Tables 4 and 9, although the standard errors were larger and the model did
not appear to fit as well. I then removed the information about the presence of a
hedge fund from the score. The results were the same for Tables 4 and 9. Once
again, however, model fit was diminished and the litigation score standard
37 These results are available by request from the author.















errors increased in magnitude. The results were also the same if I use this
litigation score with no information about investor type and added a dummy
control variable that takes on a value of 1 if a hedge fund was observed holding
junior claims.38 Overall, this exercise suggests that the results are robust to
simpler measures of junior activism.
A fourth possible source of bias is that opportunities to file the lifecycle
objections do not exist in every case. For example, in some cases the debtor
disposes of the assets through a single motion to sell all assets. In others, the
debtor files a disclosure statement, a plan and sometimes a motion to sell all
assets as well. To guard against bias created by extra chances to object, I com-
pute a standardized litigation score by summing each creditor’s score for the
four life cycle objections, dividing that number by the number of opportunities
to object and multiplying the ratio by four and adding it to the extraordinary
motions and activist investor scores. The results for both appraised transaction
value and direct bankruptcy costs remain the same and the magnitude of the
coefficients is similar.
5 . D I S C U S S I O N
In this article, I investigate two clashing views on the role that junior activists
play in Chapter 11. A cautious interpretation of the results suggests that the
criticism of the junior activist investing strategy studied herein, as opposed to
the criticism of junior activists in some high-profile cases, is misplaced. Junior
activism is associated with higher appraised value, relative to cases with less
observed junior activism. This suggests that, at the least, junior activists are
litigating in the cases where there is relatively more value rather than indis-
criminately buying claims and trying to exploit the bankruptcy process to in-
efficiently extract settlements. Further, junior activists appear to realize positive
returns after judicial orders they influence with litigation, suggesting they suc-
cessfully influence the process in the favor of junior claimants. Although junior
activist litigation is also associated with an increase in observed direct bank-
ruptcy costs, the magnitude of direct bankruptcy costs is relatively small—only
1.3 percent of appraised transaction value in the median sample case.
Any concern about junior activist value extraction is further ameliorated by
the relatively meager settlements that junior activists receive outside of the
38 More specifically, I re-estimate Tables 4, 5, and 8 using this alternative specification and the behavior
of the litigation score remains consistent across the specifications in Tables 4 and 8 as well as Models
1 through 3 of Table 5. The dummy for the presence of an activist investor is statistically significant
and positively related to the dependent variables in the Table 4 models but does not appear to be
statistically significantly related to the Table 5 models or the measures of bankruptcy costs in Table 9.















absolute priority rule. This calls the ability of junior activists to inefficiently
extract senior creditor value into question. Theoretically, the power to litigate
could incentivize junior activists to file frivolous claims to extract hold-up value
by inflicting cost and delay on senior creditors. The small settlement size sug-
gests that junior activists lack the necessary bargaining power to extract signifi-
cant value.
The evidence also fails to support the view that junior activists hold the firm
hostage and destroy value. Sound theoretical reasons exist to suspect that junior
activists have the ability to prolong a bankruptcy case. However, I did not
observe a statistically significant relationship between junior activist litigation
and the duration of the bankruptcy case. This may be due to bankruptcy judges
refusing to allow junior activists to stand in the way of a deal supported by
senior creditors and management. It could also be a consequence of the high-
bargaining leverage of senior creditors, who are often also debtor-in-possession
lenders that keep the firm on a short leash (Skeel 2003).
However, the results standing on their own do not prove causation. The
results demonstrate that junior activism is associated with a higher transaction
value controlling for balance sheet characteristics and market expectations. The
results also show that, at least for the subsample for which I have complete data,
junior activists appear to yield a positive return by influencing the judicial
process. I cannot, however, rule out endogeneity, omitted variables or other
alternative explanations. Nonetheless, theoretical reasons and anecdotal evi-
dence support a causal interpretation. Activist investors manage billions of dol-
lars of funds that execute distressed investing strategies. Buying mispriced junior
claims and using litigation to create leverage is a prominent distressed investing
strategy. If distressed investors could not increase returns through activism, it
would constitute a major market failure as the sellers of distressed debt would be
giving up profits to distressed debt investors that they could realize on their own
simply by holding onto the claim.39 These activists observe the relative efficacy
of their litigation strategies—often from the court’s gallery—and they under-
stand exactly how their investment in professional fees influenced the outcome.
Rational investors will only expend resources to monitor managers and influ-
ence the firm if expected gains exceed the costs of activism.
Similarly, the study cannot definitively resolve the question of the social
efficiency of junior activism. As a threshold matter, the observed positive
39 In some cases, sellers of distressed claims are required to sell debt after ratings agency downgrades
because of regulatory constraints. For example, some insurance companies may not be allowed to
hold debt of firms in default. If there was no need to understand and influence Chapter 11 to protect
these claims, one would expect forced sellers to find a solution to a problem of forced loss taking that
did not require them to provide free profits to buyers unconstrained by regulation.















relationship between junior activism and the direct costs of bankruptcy raises
the possibility that junior activists decrease the social efficiency of Chapter 11,
consistent with the view of their detractors. However, the results also identify,
for the first time, important associations between junior activism and benefits
that might offset the observed increase in costs. For example, the increase in
appraised transaction value suggests that junior activists might play a role in
upholding the absolute priority rule, which might preserve the incentives to
monitor created by ex ante debt contracting (Triantis 1994; Adler 2012).40
Junior activists might also limit the ability of managers to extract value at the
expense of pre-bankruptcy investors.41 To the extent this is true, junior activists
could, in effect, reduce the bankruptcy cost of managerial rent extraction even
as they increase litigation costs. Of course, it is equally possible that the prospect
of a large payday in Chapter 11 helps limit inefficient continuation and that
junior activists upset this incentive by making managerial rent extraction
harder (e.g., Bebchuk 2002). More data and research is needed to come to
firmer conclusions on the question of social efficiency.
The results also add a new wrinkle to some of the theoretical debates among
bankruptcy scholars on corporate governance in Chapter 11. First, contempor-
ary scholarship focuses on the dominant role of “creditors” in corporate gov-
ernance in Chapter 11 and the powerful lever of corporate governance created
by restrictive debtor-in-possession loans. The results presented here suggest
that intercreditor disputes are also important and that litigation is a lever of
corporate governance that junior claimants can use to influence the bankruptcy
case in their favor.
Second, the results provide an explanation for an essential mystery in the
distressed debt markets. Three major changes happened in Chapter 11 at the
same time: changes to the Uniform Commercial Code that increased the bar-
gaining leverage of senior secured lenders and inaugurated the “secured creditor
in possession” era, the enormous growth of an industry of distressed hedge
funds who seek to profit by buying misvalued, low-rated claims of bankrupt
firms, and the increase in claims trading (Levitin 2009), driven in large part by
the massive inflow of capital managed by funds looking to profit from a dis-
tressed strategy. The data suggests that creditors can influence bankruptcy out-
comes by participating in corporate governance. This implies that at least part
of the “distressed debt trade” is the sale of claims to specialists who know
40 Indeed, to the extent the capital markets anticipate junior activism, the activity of junior activists
might facilitate the construction of those efficient monitoring arrangements in the first place.
41 Bris and Welch (2005) use a formal model of bankruptcy bargaining to show that the cost of capital
decreases as the ability of managers to expropriate creditor wealth in Chapter 11 is reduced.















bankruptcy and business turnarounds. Secured lender control may have
increased the need for junior claimants to use litigation to defend their recov-
eries; this may have increased the need for the holders of claims of bankrupt
firms to have specialized expertise in Chapter 11. Further research is needed,
but anecdotal evidence does suggest that litigation increased over the past
decade (e.g., Miller 2007).
Additionally, the results have at least two important ramifications for dis-
cussions of bankruptcy reform. First, the results suggest that hedge funds use
litigation to counterbalance the powers of managers and senior creditors of
Chapter 11 debtors. This is exactly how the bankruptcy code was designed to
work and it suggests that criticism of litigious hedge funds is overstated, at least
with respect to junior activists pursuing the investment strategy studied in this
article. Second, a recent trend in corporate finance is to provide senior debt
with credit protection by waiving any rights junior debt holders have to object
to bankruptcy motions. Although the lenders investing under a second lien
credit facility are sophisticated, there are reasons to worry that “silenced”
junior claimants might be unable to prevent the bankruptcy judge from hearing
legal arguments on important aspects of the restructuring. Thus far, judges
interpreting these agreements have generally embraced a fact intensive, case-
by-case approach that carefully considers the merits of the legal argument and
the equitable considerations at issue instead of mechanically enforcing the
bankruptcy waivers of the junior claimant. The results in this article suggest
this approach might be meritorious as the low value of settlements outside of
the absolute priority rule suggests that obstructionist litigation may not be a
profitable investment.42
6 . C O N C L U S I O N
Junior activism is a pervasive feature of contemporary Chapter 11 practice.
Junior activists are blamed for increasing bankruptcy costs, abusing the due
process rights created by Chapter 11 to extract hold-up value and reducing the
attractiveness of Chapter 11 as a solution to the business problems of struggling
firms. On the other hand, junior activists believe they play an important role in
balancing the self-interest of management and the bargaining power of secured
lenders. Corporate governance dynamics in Chapter 11 present a moral hazard
problem as managers and senior creditors control the bankruptcy process and
42 For example, Judge Chapman performed a technical reading of contractual language to allow a
“silenced” second lien lender to object to a proposed sale of the firm’s assets. See In re Boston
Generating, Tr. at 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).















they each have powerful incentives to enrich themselves by expropriating value
that would go to junior claimholders if the firm reorganized its assets in the
highest value transaction with an accurate appraisal. These incentives challenge
the ability of Chapter 11 to accomplish its policy goals of maximizing creditor
recoveries and honoring pre-bankruptcy entitlements.
In this article, I presented results from the first empirical study of junior
activism to look for evidence of the net effect of junior activists on the outcome
of a sizable sample of bankruptcy cases. The methodology measured junior
activist litigation as a proxy for the time and money junior activists expend
to influence the bankruptcy bargaining process. Junior activism is observed to
be associated with an increase in the appraised transaction value, consistent
with the view that junior activists might play a role in deterring or counter-
balancing managerial misbehavior. However, junior activist litigation also ap-
pears to be associated with an increase in direct bankruptcy costs. These costs
are relatively small compared to the size of the large firms in study and the size
of the observed increase in appraised transaction value associated with junior
activism.
Additionally, the associations in the study call into question the notion that
junior activists use litigation inefficiently to extract value beyond their entitle-
ments. The settlements that junior activists receive are relatively small and imply
that junior activists have little leverage to extract sizable value from senior
creditors. This conclusion is supported by the failure to reject the null hypoth-
esis of no relationship between junior activist litigation and indirect bankruptcy
costs as well as the market evidence suggesting that some firms still overcom-
pensated senior creditors even after junior activists intervened. The results sug-
gest that junior activists are unlikely to view meritless litigation as a positive net
present value investment in legal fees. Overall, the results cast doubt on the view
that junior activists have a systematic negative effect on Chapter 11.
A P P E N D I X 1
Litigation Score Components
My procedure for constructing the litigation score was as follows. For each case
in the sample, I reviewed the docket and all pleadings filed by all creditors in
response to the “life cycle” motions below or seeking the extraordinary relief
described below. I also reviewed the orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court in
response to the pleadings to determine what the outcome was. As this approach
is a new one to the bankruptcy literature, I explain each of the components I
included in the index.
















The first four components of the index represent a creditor or shareholder’s
response to the four motions that constitute the major “life cycle” events of a
reorganizing debtor. When a firm files for bankruptcy, it often must negotiate
financing to remain alive; then it either exits bankruptcy through a motion to
sell substantially all of its assets or it engages in a restructuring transaction by
soliciting a vote through a disclosure statement on a plan of reorganization. At
each of these hearings, the debtor bears the burden of proving the motion at
issue meets the applicable standards under the bankruptcy code. Creditors and
shareholders have a statutory right to object to each of these motions, to con-
duct fact discovery and to be heard at the hearing. When a creditor chooses to
utilize these remedies, she informs the judge that the Debtor’s management is
acting contrary to its fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate—often
in connection with plans to overcompensate senior activist investors.
These objections provide a proxy for the length of time that a junior activist is
involved in trying to influence the case. The financing motion will usually come
at the beginning, with the disclosure statement coming in the middle, and a
motion to approve a plan (or to sell substantially all of the assets) coming at the
end.
Financing Motion—Most large firms require permission to use their encum-
bered cash collateral or additional financing to reorganize successfully. The
firm’s new or existing lenders usually allow the firm access to liquidity only
in exchange for very tight covenants that limit the debtor’s flexibility in reor-
ganizing. For example, the bondholders of TerreStar objected to the terms of a
proposed financing, informing the Court that the financing “will propel these
cases down an irreversible, predetermined course charted for the singular pur-
pose of serving [the secured lender]’s interests at the expense—and to the det-
riment of all other stakeholders.”43 By objecting to the financing motion, junior
activists inform the bankruptcy judge that the firm has aligned itself with one
creditor constituency at the expense of another and ask for judicial relief.
Sale Objection—Bankruptcy court is often an auction block for the firm’s
assets. It is not always the case that a firm is able to command its “true value” in
a bankruptcy auction. If some buyers are liquidity constrained, for example,
then alternative transactions may yield a higher recovery. In some cases, auc-
tions are run strategically to gather evidence to support management’s (or a
senior creditor’s) view of the firm’s value. One Delaware Judge rejected such an
attempt: “[the sales process] was not run robustly or broad enough to truly
market test the debtors’ value. I think it was a litigation tactic [meant to provide
43 See In re Terrestar Networks Inc., 2010 WL 4688705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. November 9, 2010).















evidence supporting a plan preferred by the firm’s senior creditors].”44 A junior
activist can play an important role in informing the bankruptcy judge that a
sales process is an inadequate attempt by management to make a favored pur-
chaser the firm’s new owner.
Disclosure Statement Objection—In Chapter 11, a firm seeking to reorganize
through a plan of reorganization must first file a disclosure statement describing
the restructuring transaction, providing junior activists with a chance to object.
For example, the Official Committee of Shareholders of Accuride used their
objection to the disclosure statement to inform the judge that the proposed
transaction underappraised the debtor and overcompensated senior creditors.45
Plan Objection—In order to confirm a plan of reorganization, a debtor must
prove that their plan complies with the various protections the bankruptcy code
provides for creditors.
Motions to Seek to Discipline or Replace Management
The bankruptcy code provides a creditor with the substantive right to seek
extraordinary remedies in the event that management fails to act in the best
interests of all creditors. In practice, these motions are often used as litigation
tactics to focus a judge’s attention on perceived managerial misbehavior. They
provide the moving creditor with court time to air their grievances. I include
five extraordinary motions in my score and they provide information about the
intensity of the dispute between junior activists and managers.
Terminate Exclusivity—Creditors and shareholders can seek to terminate
management’s exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.
Competing Plan—If exclusivity has lapsed or been terminated, junior activists
can propose their own plan of reorganization.
Trustee—Creditors can seek to appoint a trustee to take control of the busi-
ness away from management.
Official Committee Status—Junior creditors and shareholders who feel un-
represented in the bankruptcy can seek the appointment of an official commit-
tee to represent them and increase their bargaining leverage. Gaining “official”
status allows a group of activist investors to gain access to funding for their
lawyers and investment bankers from the bankruptcy estate. I provide the
junior activist one point if they filed a motion seeking the appointment of an
official committee or if they successfully lobbied the US Trustee to do so.
44 In re CCS Medical, Tr. at 135 (Bankr. D. Del. October 23, 2009).
45 See The Official Committee of Equity Security Holders’ Combined Objection to (I) the Disclosure
Statement and (II) the Rights Offering, In re Accuride, No. 09-13449 (Bankr. D. Del. December 15,
2009).















Examiner—Junior activists can seek the appointment of an examiner to in-
vestigate managerial incompetence, misconduct or dishonesty including such
acts as proposing an undervalued restructuring transaction.
Judicial Rulings
Judicial Rulings—When the judge grants one of the requests for extraordinary
relief in this section, it provides the junior activist with additional bargaining
power and shows that the request was meritorious. They receive an extra point
in the index for requests granted. This provides information about the quality
of the junior activist’s argument and the amount of money the junior activist
has invested in the presentation of the arguments.
Activist Investor Involvement
Involvement of an Activist Investor—I provide an additional point if a “hedge
fund” (using Jiang, Li, & Wang (2012)’s definition) is observed holding the
junior claim, either by appearing in court directly or by sitting on an Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors. This provides information about the cap-
abilities of the junior activists—hedge funds often have the ability to provide
liquidity, specialized expertise and a tolerance for more aggressive litigation that
traditional banks and insurance companies lack.
A P P E N D I X 2
Definitions for the Regression Variables
This list includes all the variables from the regressions other than the litigation
score in alphabetical order.
Activist Investor Observed in Junior Claim—A dummy variable that takes on a
value of 1 if an “activist investor” (as described above) appears on the applicable
court docket holding the junior claim.
Log Amount of Debt in Capital Structure with Absolute Priority Over Claim
Held by Junior Activist—The natural log of the amount of funded debt senior in
the capital structure to the junior activist. I use this to control for the hetero-
geneity of capital structures in the sample firms.
APR Violation—A binary dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the
absolute priority rule was violated in favor of the lowest ranking activist
investor.
Log Assets—The natural log of the earliest representation of the firm’s asset
value provided by the debtor. This usually comes from the bankruptcy petition
but in some cases comes from financial statements attached to court pleadings
or the firm’s statements and schedules.















D HY Bond Spread—This variable is alternatively: (i) the difference between
the Bank of America Merrill Lynch High Yield Index value on the date the firm
files for bankruptcy and the date a plan is confirmed; or (ii) the difference
between the high-yield index value on the petition date and the date a sale of
all assets is consummated. I use this to control for changes in credit market
conditions. Obtained from Datastream.
Log Court Costs—The natural log of the final amount of compensation
and expense reimbursement requested by the debtor’s lead bankruptcy law
firm.
Log Days in Chapter 11—The natural log of the days that substantially all of
the firm’s assets are under bankruptcy court administration. The earliest of:
(a) the date the debtor filed a notice that substantially all of the firm’s assets
were sold; (b) the date the Court approved a motion to sell substantially all of
the firm’s assets, in the event no notice of the sale was available and such sale
was not consummated pursuant to a plan of reorganization; (c) the effective
date of the final sale of the debtor’s assets in a piecemeal liquidation; (d) the
last order approving a sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets; or (e) the
date the plan of reorganization or the plan of liquidation became effective, if
the debtor disposed of its assets through a plan of reorganization or a plan of
liquidation.
Debtor Counsel Ranked in Amlaw250—A binary dummy variable that takes
on a value of 1 if the debtor’s lead bankruptcy counsel is ranked in the 2009
American Lawyer Magazine ranking of the 250 largest law firms; 0 otherwise. I
include this as a proxy for the “price” of the firm, as firms not on this list tend to
provide cheaper legal services in a more cost-efficient manner.
Delaware or SDNY Administration—A binary dummy variable that takes on a
value of 1 if the bankruptcy case is in the District of Delaware or the Southern
District of New York; 0 otherwise. I include this variable to control for variation
caused by the experience and expertise of the judges in these two courts. These
judges see the vast majority of large corporate bankruptcies and they are gen-
erally more experienced and benefit from better developed law than in any
other court.
Junior Claim—A binary dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the
claim in the analysis is a junior claim in the firm’s capital structure.
Log Market Value of Firm Implied by Trading Prices of Debt on Petition Date—
The sum of the trading prices of the firm’s outstanding financial debt instru-
ments multiplied by the size of the issue. Obtained from MarkIt and
Datastream.
Log Market Value of Firm on Petition Date Implied by the Trading Prices of
Debt and Equity—The sum of the trading prices of the firm’s outstanding















financial debt instruments multiplied by the size of the issue plus the trading
price of the firm’s outstanding equity securities multiplied by the number of
shares outstanding. Obtained from Datastream.
Log Outstanding Debt—The natural log of the sum of all outstanding debt as
of the petition date that the debtor owes pursuant to loan agreements, bond
indentures or other forms of debt financing. This number is taken from the first
day affidavit annexed to the bankruptcy petition. This variable controls for the
size of the firm.
Objection to Motion—A binary dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a
junior activist objected to the debtor’s motion.
Percentage of Funded Debt Senior to Maximum Level—The percentage of the
firm’s capital structure that is senior to the claim of the activist investor holding
the lowest ranking debt. Takes on a value of 1 when activist shareholders are
observed. This variable controls for how much of the firm’s debt needs to be
paid before the junior activist receives a recovery.
Plan of Reorganization Confirmed—A binary dummy variable that takes on a
value of 1 if the assets are reorganized through a plan of reorganization; 0
otherwise. I include this variable in the costs regressions because reorganizing
with a plan of reorganization (as opposed to a sale of the firm’s assets outside of
a plan process) generally takes longer and is more expensive.
Prenegotiated Filing—A binary dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if
the first day affidavit declares the case to be “prenegotiated;” 0 otherwise. I
control for this because firms with prenegotiated plans of negotiation arrive in
bankruptcy court with some portion of the bargaining already completed.
Firms usually negotiate with senior creditors first and junior activists are
often deeply disappointed with the result of these negotiations. In these situ-
ations, the case should be shorter and cheaper relative to cases where all the
negotiations occur in court because management has already completed much
of the work of assembling a business plan
Prepackaged Filing—A binary dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the
debtor files for bankruptcy with binding votes on a plan of reorganization
having already been solicited and tabulated in favor of a proposed plan of
reorganization; 0 otherwise.
Log Total Enterprise Value—The natural log of the appraised value of the
restructuring transaction. Taken alternatively from: (i) the approved disclos-
ure statement; (ii) a judicial decision; (iii) the sale price from a cash auction;
(iv) an affidavit filed by the debtor’s investment bankers or managers stating
the estimated total enterprise value; (v) a motion subsequent to the plan
supporting a settlement of a valuation dispute; or (vi) the sum of a series of
liquidating sales.















A P P E N D I X 3
Methodology for Identifying Absolute Priority Rule Violations
I identify absolute priority rule violations using detailed capital structure
models. On a superficial analysis, the absolute priority rule was violated in
thirty-one of the sixty-seven cases where the lowest level of the capital structure
received a distribution. On closer inspection of the data, this number hides a
handful of false positives. Of the thirty-one apparent violations, two were ac-
tually distributions pursuant to the absolute priority rule where unsecured
creditors shared with secured creditors in unencumbered estate value. In
other words, the secured lenders had leaky collateral packages and the distri-
butions were made in accordance with priority rules.46
Table A1. Sample Comparison
Study Time Range Sample Size
Ayotte & Morrison (2009) July 2001–December 2001 153; 85 included
in regressions
Lubben (2012) 2004 97
LoPucki & Doherty (2002) 1991–1996 98
LoPucki & Doherty (2011) 1998–2007 102
Ellias (2015) 2009–2010 107
Ivashina, Iverson, & Smith (2015) 1998–August 2009 136
Lemmon, Ma, & Tashjian (2009) 1991–2004 143
Wang (2011) 1996–2007 157
Carapeto (2006) 1986–1997 172
Ayotte & Skeel (2004) 1990–1999 264
Eisenberg & LoPucki (1999) 1980–1997 284
Harner & Maricinic (2011) 2002–2008 296
Adler, Capkun, & Weiss (2012) January 1993–March 2004 342
Jiang, Li, & Wang (2012) 1996–2007 474
46 The cumbersome process of removing “false positives” suggests a fundamental flaw in many abso-
lute priority rule studies that rely on bright line rules to identify an absolute priority rule violation.
In practice, the only reliable bright line is that all creditors must be paid in full before shareholders
receive a distribution. Studies relying on distributions to unsecured creditors will have false positives
(unencumbered value that is shared pro rata in accordance with state law) and false negatives (the
absolute priority rule is violated by distributions to junior secured lenders before senior secured
lenders are paid in full, a distinction not noted in any of the major absolute priority rule violation
studies). In some cases, unsecured debt is structurally senior to secured debt or secured debt holders
may have liens on a single project and properly share with unsecured creditors in unencumbered
value. Additionally, caution should be taken in observing absolute priority rule violations based only
on distributions to equity—the variation some studies observe over time may have more to do with
the preference of firms to finance projects with low-ranked debt instead of equity and accordingly
funding their business with a proportionally higher level of debt. Further research is needed to
understand how the absolute priority rule has changed over time.















The absolute priority rule was clearly violated in twenty-nine cases. In four-
teen cases, warrants were distributed that violated the absolute priority rule by
providing junior investors a continuing claim against the reorganized firm
when senior claimants were not paid in full. In five cases, senior creditors
made a cash payment to junior activists, which was sometimes split with
Table A3. Bankruptcy outcomes
N %
Outcome of Plan Process
Plan Confirmed 76 70.37
Assets Sold Outside of Plan Process 32 29.63
Assets Sold 47 43.52
Ownership after Bankruptcy
Owned by Pre-Bankruptcy Investors 61 56.48
All Asset Sale to Strategic Purchaser 22 20.37
All Asset Sale to Financial Purchaser 12 11.11
Piecemeal Liquidation 12 11.11
Status After Bankruptcy
Emerged Independent (includes ownership by financial sponsor) 73 67.59
Did not Emerge as Independent Firm 34 32.41
Sale Currency
Cash 39 36.11
Credit Bid 8 7.41





TX SD 3 3
NV 3 3
TX WD 3 3





Sale intended 28 27
Liquidation intended 7 7
Liquidity
New money debtor-in-possession loan 61 57
Lien on cash collateral, no new money 33 31
No cash collateral motion or debtor-in-possession loan 13 12
Counsel
AmLaw250 83 78
Not Amlaw250 24 22





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































other unsecured creditors (in three of these cases, warrants were also distrib-
uted). These payments were for nominal amounts, ranging from $900,000 to
$11 million. In thirteen cases, the out of the money creditor or shareholder
received a portion of the reorganized firm’s equity.
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